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A comprehensive guide to the theory and practice of experimental auctions.
Economists, psychologists, and marketers are interested in determining the monetary value people place on non-market goods for a variety of reasons: to carry out cost-benefit analysis, to determine the welfare effects of technological innovation or public policy, to forecast new product success, and to understand individual and consumer behavior. Unfortunately, many currently available techniques for eliciting individuals' values suffer from a serious problem in that they involve asking individuals hypothetical questions about intended behavior. Experimental auctions circumvent this problem because they involve individuals exchanging real money for real goods in an active market. This represents a promising means for eliciting non-market values. Lusk and Shogren provide a comprehensive guide to the theory and practice of experimental auctions. It will be a valuable resource to graduate students, practitioners and researchers concerned with the design and utilization of experimental auctions in applied economic and marketing research.
Review quote:
'Lusk and Shogren have developed an indispensable guide to an important methodology that is growing in relevance and significance in economics, marketing, psychology and public policy research. Their book is both technically strong and very accessible, even for the non-specialist. The authors have filled the book with interesting and compelling examples that bring the method to life and demonstrate its applicability. Any scholar interested in understanding how individuals value non-market options should have this book on their shelf.'
David W. Stewart, Robert E. Brooker Professor of Marketing, Marshall School of Business, University of Southern California
'These well-qualified authors provide a thorough treatise on the design and application of auction procedures as instruments for measuring the value of new or non-marketed commodities, rights and services - perhaps the most important development in experimental auctions since the first tests over 25 years ago.'
Vernon L. Smith, winner of the 2002 Nobel Prize for Economics and Professor of Economics and Law, George Mason University
Table of contents:
1. Introduction; 2. Theory of incentive compatible auctions and evidence from induced value experiments; 3. Value theory; 4. Conducting an experimental auction: some preliminaries; 5. Conducting experimental auctions; 6. Data analysis with experimental auction bids; 7. Valuation case studies; 8. Case studies on auction design; 9. Validity of experimental auctions; 10. Conclusion; Index.
Economists, psychologists, and marketers are interested in determining the monetary value people place on non-market goods for a variety of reasons: to carry out cost-benefit analysis, to determine the welfare effects of technological innovation or public policy, to forecast new product success, and to understand individual and consumer behavior. Unfortunately, many currently available techniques for eliciting individuals' values suffer from a serious problem in that they involve asking individuals hypothetical questions about intended behavior. Experimental auctions circumvent this problem because they involve individuals exchanging real money for real goods in an active market. This represents a promising means for eliciting non-market values. Lusk and Shogren provide a comprehensive guide to the theory and practice of experimental auctions. It will be a valuable resource to graduate students, practitioners and researchers concerned with the design and utilization of experimental auctions in applied economic and marketing research.
Review quote:
'Lusk and Shogren have developed an indispensable guide to an important methodology that is growing in relevance and significance in economics, marketing, psychology and public policy research. Their book is both technically strong and very accessible, even for the non-specialist. The authors have filled the book with interesting and compelling examples that bring the method to life and demonstrate its applicability. Any scholar interested in understanding how individuals value non-market options should have this book on their shelf.'
David W. Stewart, Robert E. Brooker Professor of Marketing, Marshall School of Business, University of Southern California
'These well-qualified authors provide a thorough treatise on the design and application of auction procedures as instruments for measuring the value of new or non-marketed commodities, rights and services - perhaps the most important development in experimental auctions since the first tests over 25 years ago.'
Vernon L. Smith, winner of the 2002 Nobel Prize for Economics and Professor of Economics and Law, George Mason University
Table of contents:
1. Introduction; 2. Theory of incentive compatible auctions and evidence from induced value experiments; 3. Value theory; 4. Conducting an experimental auction: some preliminaries; 5. Conducting experimental auctions; 6. Data analysis with experimental auction bids; 7. Valuation case studies; 8. Case studies on auction design; 9. Validity of experimental auctions; 10. Conclusion; Index.
'These well-qualified authors provide a thorough treatise on the design and application of auction procedures as instruments for measuring the value of new or non-marketed commodities, rights and services - perhaps the most important development in experimental auctions since the first tests over 25 years ago.' Vernon L. Smith, winner of the 2002 Nobel Prize for Economics and Professor of Economics and Law, George Mason University