Argues that the idea that consciousness poses a hard problem is plausibly based on how consciousness appears to us in first-person access. The book offers a debunking argument to undercut the justificatory link between the first-person appearances and our hard problem intuitions.
Argues that the idea that consciousness poses a hard problem is plausibly based on how consciousness appears to us in first-person access. The book offers a debunking argument to undercut the justificatory link between the first-person appearances and our hard problem intuitions.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Josh Weisberg is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Houston. He is the author of Consciousness (2014) and editor of Qualitative Consciousness: Themes from the Philosophy of David Rosenthal (2022) and has published a range of articles in philosophy of mind and consciousness studies.
Inhaltsangabe
1. Explanatory Optimism 2. The Hard Problem and Qualitative Inaccuracy 3. The Appearances to be Explained 4. Present and Past Debunkers 5. Automated Compression Theory 6. ACT, Expertise, and First-Person Access 7. Optimistic ACT at Work
1. Explanatory Optimism 2. The Hard Problem and Qualitative Inaccuracy 3. The Appearances to be Explained 4. Present and Past Debunkers 5. Automated Compression Theory 6. ACT, Expertise, and First-Person Access 7. Optimistic ACT at Work
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