Sanjai Bhagat is Provost Professor of Finance at the University of Colorado Boulder. He has worked previously at the US Securities and Exchange Commission, Princeton University, New Jersey and the University of Chicago. He is a board member of ProLink Solutions, an enterprise software company; Integra Ventures, a venture capital company; and the National Association of Corporate Directors, Colorado Chapter. He has advised US government agencies and Fortune 500 companies on corporate governance and finance issues, and has submitted several amici curiae briefs on class action litigation to the US Supreme Court, which have been cited in the high court's decision.
Inhaltsangabe
1. Introduction 2. Mortgage public policies: 'cause' of the crisis 3. Pre-crisis executive compensation and misaligned incentives 4. Managerial incentives hypothesis versus the unforeseen risk hypothesis 5. Bank CEOs' buys and sells during 2000-8 6. Executive compensation reform 7. Director compensation policy 8. Are large banks riskier? 9. Bank capital structure and executive compensation 10. Why banks should be mostly debt financed: parade of non sequiturs 11. Conclusion.
1. Introduction 2. Mortgage public policies: 'cause' of the crisis 3. Pre-crisis executive compensation and misaligned incentives 4. Managerial incentives hypothesis versus the unforeseen risk hypothesis 5. Bank CEOs' buys and sells during 2000-8 6. Executive compensation reform 7. Director compensation policy 8. Are large banks riskier? 9. Bank capital structure and executive compensation 10. Why banks should be mostly debt financed: parade of non sequiturs 11. Conclusion.
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