The government and the central bank are
interconnected by a consolidated public sector
budget constraint: the operational deficit of the
budget is financed by new borrowings and by
seigniorage. This means that, even given the central
bank s formal independence of the government, the
former must nevertheless take into account problems
in the fiscal sphere. Thus one of the fundamental
problems in the analysis of macroeconomic policy is
that of the interaction between the government and
the central bank in conducting fiscal and monetary
policies. The thesis continues this line of inquiry.
It attempts to elucidate the most general problems
which may in principle arise in describing the logic
of this interaction. Various results pertain to the
problems of macroeconomic policy in developed
countries and in economies with undeveloped
financial markets
interconnected by a consolidated public sector
budget constraint: the operational deficit of the
budget is financed by new borrowings and by
seigniorage. This means that, even given the central
bank s formal independence of the government, the
former must nevertheless take into account problems
in the fiscal sphere. Thus one of the fundamental
problems in the analysis of macroeconomic policy is
that of the interaction between the government and
the central bank in conducting fiscal and monetary
policies. The thesis continues this line of inquiry.
It attempts to elucidate the most general problems
which may in principle arise in describing the logic
of this interaction. Various results pertain to the
problems of macroeconomic policy in developed
countries and in economies with undeveloped
financial markets