This book presents a theoretical framework to discuss how governments coordinate budgeting decisions. Based on original research on European Union countries from 1985 to 2004, the authors argue that the effectiveness of a given form of fiscal governance depends crucially upon the underlying political system.
This book presents a theoretical framework to discuss how governments coordinate budgeting decisions. Based on original research on European Union countries from 1985 to 2004, the authors argue that the effectiveness of a given form of fiscal governance depends crucially upon the underlying political system.
Mark Hallerberg is Professor of Public Management and Political Economy at the Hertie School of Governance. He also maintains an affiliation with the Political Science department at Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia. He has published widely on fiscal governance, tax competition, exchange rate choice and European politics. He has held academic positions previously at Emory University, the University of Pittsburgh and the Georgia Institute of Technology. He has also served as a visiting scholar at the University of Amsterdam, the University of Bonn, the University of Mannheim and the University of Munich (all in economics departments). He has done consulting work for the Dutch Ministry of Finance, Ernst and Young, Poland, the European Central Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the World Bank.
Inhaltsangabe
1. Introduction 2. Electoral and fiscal institutions and forms of fiscal governance 3. An account of fiscal norms and rules in the European Union from 1985 to 2004 4. How forms of fiscal governance affect fiscal performance 5. Why do countries have different fiscal institutions? 6. Institutional choice in new democracies: fiscal governance in Central and East European countries 7. EMU and fiscal governance in Europe 8. Conclusion.
1. Introduction 2. Electoral and fiscal institutions and forms of fiscal governance 3. An account of fiscal norms and rules in the European Union from 1985 to 2004 4. How forms of fiscal governance affect fiscal performance 5. Why do countries have different fiscal institutions? 6. Institutional choice in new democracies: fiscal governance in Central and East European countries 7. EMU and fiscal governance in Europe 8. Conclusion.
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