Fitting Things Together - Worsnip, Alex
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Some combinations of attitudes--beliefs, credences, intentions, preferences, hopes, fears, and so on--do not fit together right: they are incoherent. A natural idea is that there are requirements of "structural rationality" that forbid us from being in these incoherent states. Yet many philosophers have recently attempted to minimize or eliminate structural rationality, arguing that it is just a "shadow" of "substantive rationality"--that is, correctly responding to one's reasons. In Fitting Things Together, Alex Worsnip pushes back against this trend, providing the first sustained defense of…mehr

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Produktbeschreibung
Some combinations of attitudes--beliefs, credences, intentions, preferences, hopes, fears, and so on--do not fit together right: they are incoherent. A natural idea is that there are requirements of "structural rationality" that forbid us from being in these incoherent states. Yet many philosophers have recently attempted to minimize or eliminate structural rationality, arguing that it is just a "shadow" of "substantive rationality"--that is, correctly responding to one's reasons. In Fitting Things Together, Alex Worsnip pushes back against this trend, providing the first sustained defense of the view that structural rationality is a genuine, autonomous, unified, and normatively significant phenomenon.
Autorenporträt
Alex Worsnip is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He works primarily in epistemology, ethics, and the theory of rationality. He is the author of over twenty articles in leading philosophy journals such as the Journal of Philosophy, Mind, Ethics, and Noûs.