Chris Howard, Rach Cosker-Rowland

Fittingness

Essays in the Philosophy of Normativity

• Gebundenes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

This volume explores the usefulness of the notion of fittingness in investigating a range of normative matters. Topics include the nature and epistemology of fittingness, the relation between fittingness and reasons, the normativity of fittingness, fittingness and value theory, and the role of fittingness in theorizing about responsibility.

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Produktdetails

• Verlag: Oxford University Press
• Seitenzahl: 416
• Erscheinungstermin: 1. Februar 2023
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 216mm x 163mm x 46mm
• Gewicht: 771g
• ISBN-13: 9780192895882
• ISBN-10: 0192895885
• Artikelnr.: 66226540

Autorenporträt

Chris Howard is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at McGill University. He works primarily in ethics. His research has been published in leading philosophy journals including, among others, Ethics, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Oxford Studies in Metaethics, and Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics. Rach Cosker- Rowland is a Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Leeds. They are the author of The Normative and the Evaluative: The Buck-Passing Account of Value and Moral Disagreement.

Inhaltsangabe

* Section One: Introduction
* 1: Chris Howard and Rach Cosker-Rowland: Fittingness: A User's Guide
* Section Two: The Nature and Epistemology of Fittingness
* 2: Selim Berker: The Deontic, the Evaluative, and the Fitting
* 3: Thomas Hurka: Against the Fundamentality of Fit
* 4: Oded Na'aman: What Is Evaluable for Fit?
* 5: Justin D'Arms: Fitting Emotions
* 6: Philip Stratton-Lake: Intuitions of Fittingness
* Section Three: Fittingness, Reasons, Normativity
* 7: Garrett Cullity: Reasons and Fit
* 8: Rach Cosker-Rowland: Value-First Accounts of Reasons and Fit
* 9: Nicholas Southwood: Feasibility and Fitting Deliberation
* 10: Chris Howard and Stephanie Leary: In Defense of the Right Kind of
Reason
* Section Four: Fittingness and Value Theory
* 11: Conor McHugh and Jonathan Way: Value and Idiosyncratic Fitting
Attitudes
* 12: Mauro Rossi and Christine Tappolet: Well-Being as Fitting
Happiness
* 13: Sara Protasi: The Things We Envy: Fitting Envy and Human Goodness
* 14: Alex King: Response-Dependence and Aesthetic Theory
* Section Five: Fittingness and Responsibility
* 15: Michael McKenna: Fittingness as a Pitiful Intellectualist
Trinket?
* 16: Rachel Achs: Blame's Commitment to Its Own Fittingness
* 17: Hannah Tierney: Making Amends: How to Alter the Fittingness of
Blame
* Index