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This book argues that for infrastructure privatization programs, differences in firm organizational structure explain the viability of privatization contracts in weak institutional environments.

Produktbeschreibung
This book argues that for infrastructure privatization programs, differences in firm organizational structure explain the viability of privatization contracts in weak institutional environments.
Autorenporträt
Alison E. Post is Assistant Professor of Political Science and Global Metropolitan Studies at the University of California, Berkeley. Prior to joining the Berkeley faculty, she was a Postdoctoral Fellow with the Committee on Global Thought at Columbia University, a Visiting Researcher at the Centro de Estudios de Estado y Sociedad in Buenos Aires and the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean in Santiago, and a Researcher at the London School of Urban Research in London. Her doctoral dissertation won the 2009 William Anderson award from the American Political Science Association for the best dissertation in the general field of federalism, intergovernmental relations, state or local politics.