Benjamin Jensen

Forging the Sword

Doctrinal Change in the U.S. Army

• Gebundenes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

Benjamin Jensen holds a dual appointment as a Donald L. Bren Chair of Creative Problem Solving at Marine Corps University and as a Scholar-in-Residence at the American University, School of International Service.

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Produktdetails

• Verlag: Stanford University Press
• Seitenzahl: 216
• Erscheinungstermin: 24. Februar 2016
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 231mm x 155mm x 23mm
• Gewicht: 458g
• ISBN-13: 9780804795609
• ISBN-10: 0804795606
• Artikelnr.: 44383162

Autorenporträt

Benjamin Jensen holds a dual appointment as a Donald L. Bren Chair of Creative Problem Solving at Marine Corps University and as a Scholar-in-Residence at the American University, School of International Service.

Inhaltsangabe

Contents and Abstracts
1To Change an Army
chapter abstract
This chapter establishes the core argument of the book: the role of
incubators and advocacy networks in enabling doctrinal change. Change is
not necessarily natural or easy in complex bureaucracies like the military.
Therefore, catalyzing change requires a unique configuration of
institutional factors and environment shocks. The chapter explores this
dilemma and reviews different perspectives on how military officers escape
the iron cage of bureaucracy to imagine new ways of war. The work defines
military doctrine and discusses various impediments to change as well as
past accounts of how new ways of war emerge in a defense bureaucracy. In
reviewing these different approaches, the work makes the case for a special
role for the profession of arms and the role of knowledge networks in
overcoming bureaucratic inertia.
2The First Battle of the Next War
chapter abstract
This chapter historically traces the emergence of the Active Defense
doctrine in 1976. Specifically, the chapter will empirically examine the
strategic context in terms of how military planners reconciled the Nixon
doctrine and constraints implicit in the all-volunteer force and declining
domestic resources. Senior leaders like General William DePuy used their
analysis of the Arab-Israeli War as a means of conceptualizing what a
future conventional war in Europe might look like. It was the operational
problem necessitating new doctrine. From this vantage point, the chapter
explores the institutional reform initiatives that gave birth to U.S. Army
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). TRADOC was a principal incubator
that provided DePuy and his "boathouse gang" of young officers the space
they needed to rewrite Cold War conventional doctrine.
3The Central Battle
chapter abstract
The chapter traces the emergence of the AirLand Battle doctrine as a
response to shifting perceptions of the Soviet threat and new military
concepts. First, the chapter examines the threats that drove national
security considerations in the late 1970s and 1980s emphasizing the
specific concerns voiced by Army leaders. Two stand out: the conventional
balance in Europe and increased planning for non-NATO contingencies in
Southwest Asia and the Far East Second, the analysis elucidates the
conceptual underpinnings of doctrinal innovation in the development of
AirLand Battle. Specifically, the emergence of two concepts, the Central
Battle and Extended Battlefield, drove doctrinal development in the early
1980s. In both cases, incubators and advocacy networks proved central to
helping military professionals define operational problems and spread their
new concept across the organization.
4The New Warrior Class
chapter abstract
The chapter traces how senior military officers in TRADOC and the
Department of the Army articulated threats following the Cold War. The case
examines TRADOC initiatives linked to establishing a new war-fighting
paradigm that crystallized in the June 1993 publication of FM 100-5,
Operations, and the follow on 1994 TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI
Operations. The new FM 100-5 embodied the broader realignment to a
contingency-based force after the end of the Cold War. Force XXI linked
together this vision of threat everywhere with new concepts governing the
optimal mix of information technology. In tracing the episode, the chapter
uncovers how incubators and advocacy networks helped officers develop and
diffuse new ideas about how to array forces at the operational level.
5Hearts and Minds Revisited
chapter abstract
This chapter examines the development of FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency
Operations, as an episode of doctrinal innovation. While the episode
reflects doctrinal change, it is less dramatic than heralded at the time.
Incubators and advocacy networks were present and appear to have enabled a
group of thinkers around General David Petraeus, the "coinistas," to shift
how the US defense establishment thought about counterinsurgency. The
manual and subsequent surge did change the battle in Iraq, but the core
ideas within the manual were neither new nor novel. Rather, they reflected
a long tradition in military thinking about how to counter insurgents and
guerillas to wage what was referred to during the American Revolution as
petite guerre. The doctrine was old wine in a new bottle.
6Incubators, Advocacy Networks and Organizational Change
chapter abstract
This chapter summarizes the key findings and the role of incubators and
advocacy networks in enabling doctrinal change in the U.S. Army. First, the
conclusion reviews the evidence of these institutional mechanisms in each
of the historical cases of doctrinal change. Second, it uses these findings
to reflect on how military organizations change and the implications for
defense policy. The major recommendation that emerges is a need to sustain
intellectual vibrancy in the profession of arms. The chapter calls for
sustaining funding for education and experimentation as a means of ensuring
new ideas enter the profession. In addition, it highlights the need to
maintain a professional culture where leaders publish new ideas and
encourage subordinates to do so.