In 2003, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) highlighted the perplexing differences since the end of World War II in foreign policy objectives between the United States and France. Many in the US felt France's position was a betrayal by France to the ally that had for several decades been the predominate force in securing and guaranteeing France's security during the Cold War. Anger and bewilderment in the US was manifest in editorials, talk shows, and even in books following President Chirac's decision not to support the Bush administration's course of action to resolve the perceived growing crisis in Iraq. Why would France choose such a course of action that was seemly against not only the US, but also other allies? Was that decision an anomaly or a plausible, lucid choice? More important, is there a pattern in French policy that makes its relations with the primary security arrangement in Europe, NATO, more predictable, or is the US and France entering a new phase in the relationship?
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