Do humans have the kind of free will which makes them morally responsible for their actions? Essays by distinguished scientists and philosophers investigate whether neuroscience, Quantum theory or mathematics show that human behaviour is or is not fully determined by prior brain states.
Do humans have the kind of free will which makes them morally responsible for their actions? Essays by distinguished scientists and philosophers investigate whether neuroscience, Quantum theory or mathematics show that human behaviour is or is not fully determined by prior brain states.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Richard Swinburne is Emeritus Nolloth Professor of the Philosophy of the Christian Religion, University of Oxford, and a Fellow of the British Academy
Inhaltsangabe
* Foreword * Introduction * 1: Patrick Haggard: Does Brain Science Change our View of Free Will? * 2: Tim Bayne: Free Will and the Sciences of Human Agency * 3: Richard Swinburne: Physicalism and the Determination of Action * 4: Richard Swinburne: Dualism and the Determination of Action * 5: Harald Atmanspacher and Stefan Rotter: Determinacy or its Absence in the Brain * 6: Solomon Feferman: Godel's incompleteness theorems, free will, and mathematical thought * 7: John Lucas: Response to Feferman * 8: Galen Strawson: The Impossibility of Ultimate Moral Responsibility? * 9: Helen Steward: Moral Responsibility and the Concept of Agency * 10: Howard Robinson: Substance Dualism and its Rationale * 11: R.A. Duff: What Kind of Responsibility must Criminal Law Presuppose?
* Foreword * Introduction * 1: Patrick Haggard: Does Brain Science Change our View of Free Will? * 2: Tim Bayne: Free Will and the Sciences of Human Agency * 3: Richard Swinburne: Physicalism and the Determination of Action * 4: Richard Swinburne: Dualism and the Determination of Action * 5: Harald Atmanspacher and Stefan Rotter: Determinacy or its Absence in the Brain * 6: Solomon Feferman: Godel's incompleteness theorems, free will, and mathematical thought * 7: John Lucas: Response to Feferman * 8: Galen Strawson: The Impossibility of Ultimate Moral Responsibility? * 9: Helen Steward: Moral Responsibility and the Concept of Agency * 10: Howard Robinson: Substance Dualism and its Rationale * 11: R.A. Duff: What Kind of Responsibility must Criminal Law Presuppose?
Es gelten unsere Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen: www.buecher.de/agb
Impressum
www.buecher.de ist ein Internetauftritt der buecher.de internetstores GmbH
Geschäftsführung: Monica Sawhney | Roland Kölbl | Günter Hilger
Sitz der Gesellschaft: Batheyer Straße 115 - 117, 58099 Hagen
Postanschrift: Bürgermeister-Wegele-Str. 12, 86167 Augsburg
Amtsgericht Hagen HRB 13257
Steuernummer: 321/5800/1497
USt-IdNr: DE450055826