Ken M Levy

Free Will, Responsibility, and Crime

An Introduction

• Gebundenes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

In his book, philosopher and law professor Ken Levy explains why he agrees with most people, but not with most other philosophers, about free will and responsibility.

Produktdetails

• Verlag: Jenny Stanford Publishing
• Seitenzahl: 212
• Erscheinungstermin: 12. September 2019
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 229mm x 152mm x 13mm
• Gewicht: 454g
• ISBN-13: 9780815369653
• ISBN-10: 0815369654
• Artikelnr.: 57673175

Autorenporträt

Ken M. Levy is the Holt B. Harrison Professor of Law at the Paul M. Hebert Law Center of Louisiana State University. He has written chapters for anthologies published by Oxford, Routledge, and Sage, and he has published many articles in both philosophy journals and law reviews.

Inhaltsangabe

Ch. 1. Incompatibilism Versus Compatibilism
Introduction
1. Incompatibilism
2. Indeterminism
3. Compatibilists' First Objection to Incompatibilism
4. Metaphysical Libertarianism
5. Three Possible Locations for Indeterminism
6. Metaphysical Libertarianism's Underlying Theory of the Self as Pure
Substance
7. Compatibilists' Renewed Randomness Objection
8. Two Problems with Metaphysical Libertarianism
9. Compatibilism and the Harmony Condition
10. Frankfurt's Identification Theory
11. Incompatibilists: Identification Is Insufficient for Free Will
12. Traditional Compatibilism and the Ability to Do Otherwise
13. Rationality Compatibilism
14. Compatibilists Versus Metaphysical Libertarians
15. Compatibilists Versus Free Will Skeptics
Conclusion
Ch. 2. New Compatibilism Versus the Ought-Implies-Can Principle
Introduction
1. Five Definitions of Free Will
2. Moral Responsibility
3. Frankfurt's Argument Against the Principle of Alternative
Possibilities
4. The Maxim Argument
5. The Anti-Maxim Position
6. Objections and Replies
7. Why Frankfurt's Conclusion Defeats the Maxim
Conclusion
Ch. 3. Moral Responsibility Does Not Require the Power to Do Otherwise, But
It Does Require at Least One Alternative Possibility
Introduction
1. Three Objections to Frankfurt's Argument Against PAP
2. David Hunt's Blockage Argument
3. Hunt's Neural Wall
4. Why Hunt's Blockage Argument Fails: The Dilemma Argument Against
Blockage
5. Implications for Incompatibilism
Conclusion
Ch. 4. The Puzzle of Responsibility
Introduction
1. The Responsibility Axiom and Two Kinds of Blameless Wrongdoing
2. The Blameless Wrongdoer Argument
3. A Working Conception of Responsibility
4. The Sympathy Argument
5. Just Criminal Punishment Does Not Necessarily Require Moral
Responsibility
Conclusion
Ch. 5. Contrary to Responsibility Skepticism, Metaphysical Libertarianism
Is Metaphysically Possible
Introduction
1. Responsibility Skepticism
2. The Responsibility Skeptic's Objection to Robert Kane's Defense of
Metaphysical Libertarianism
3. Supplementing Kane's Metaphysical Libertarianism with Susan Wolf's
Rationalist Theory of Responsibility
4. The Randomness Objection
5. One Last Defense of Metaphysical Libertarianism Over Responsibility
Skepticism
6. Agent Causation
Conclusion
Ch. 6. The Dark Side of Metaphysical Libertarianism
Introduction
1. The Self-Made-Man Postulate
2. Success Is (Almost?) Entirely a Matter of Good Luck
3. Constitutive Luck and Responsibility Skepticism
4. Situational Luck
5. Failure Is (Almost?) Entirely a Matter of Bad Luck
Conclusion
Ch. 7. Criminal Responsibility Does Not Require Moral Responsibility:
Psychopaths
Introduction
1. Psychopathy Defined
A. A Working Definition of Psychopathy
B. Psychological Community's Definition
C. Possible Problems with the PCL-R
D. Differences between Psychopathy and Antisocial Personality
Disorder
2. Three Consequentialist Reasons for Criminally Punishing Psychopaths
3. Three Arguments that Psychopaths Are Not Morally Responsible for
Their Criminal Behavior
A. First Argument that Psychopaths Are Not Morally Responsible for
Their Criminal Behavior: Normative Incompetence
B. Second Argument that Psychopaths Are Not Morally Responsible for
Their Criminal Behavior: Inability To Do Otherwise
C. Third Argument that Psychopaths Are Not Morally Responsible for
Their Criminal Behavior: No Self-Control
4. The Insanity Defense
A. Assumptions Underlying the Insanity Defense
B. Different Versions of the Insanity Defense
5. Four Arguments that Psychopaths Are Insane
A. First Argument that Psychopaths Are Insane
B. Second Argument that Psychopaths Are Insane
C. Third Argument that Psychopaths Are Insane
D. Fourth Argument that Psychopaths Are Insane
6. Why the Criminal Justice System Regards Psychopaths as Criminally
Responsible
7. Why Psychopaths Are Criminally Responsible Even Though They Are Not
Morally Responsible
A. Why Criminal Responsibility Does Not Require Moral Responsibility
B. Why Moral or Emotional Understanding of the Law Is Not Necessary for
Criminal Responsibility
C. Psychopaths Have Sufficient Control over Their Behavior
Conclusion
Ch. 8. Criminal Responsibility Does Not Require Moral Responsibility:
Situationism
Introduction
1. The Excuses
A. Stephen Morse's Dualist Theory of the Excuses
B. A Monist Theory of the Excuses
2. Situationism and Moral Responsibility
A. Our Nearly Universal Capacity for Cruelty
B. The Dispositionism Paradox
C. Situationism and Norm-Compliance
D. Stanley Milgram's Shock Experiment
E. Arguments for Recognizing Situationism as a Moral Excuse
3. Situationism and Criminal Responsibility
4. The Insanity Defense: Two Final Objections
Conclusion
Ch. 9. Addiction, Indoctrination, and Responsibility
Introduction
1. Addiction
2. The "Addiction Negates Responsibility" Argument
3. Addiction Versus Weakness of Will
4. The Disease theory Is Actually Consistent with Responsibility for
Addiction
5. Indoctrination
6. Doxastic Control
7. Greedy, Addict, Mr. Insane, and the Dangers of Responsibility
Skepticism
Conclusion