Ken M. Levy

Free Will, Responsibility, and Crime

An Introduction

• Broschiertes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

In his book, philosopher and law professor Ken Levy explains why he agrees with most people, but not with most other philosophers, about free will and responsibility.

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Produktdetails

• Verlag: Taylor & Francis Inc
• Seitenzahl: 214
• Erscheinungstermin: 6. September 2019
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 229mm x 152mm x 12mm
• Gewicht: 326g
• ISBN-13: 9780815369660
• ISBN-10: 0815369662
• Artikelnr.: 57733068

Autorenporträt

Ken M. Levy is the Holt B. Harrison Professor of Law at the Paul M. Hebert Law Center of Louisiana State University. He has written chapters for anthologies published by Oxford, Routledge, and Sage, and he has published many articles in both philosophy journals and law reviews.

Inhaltsangabe

Ch. 1. Incompatibilism Versus Compatibilism Introduction 1. Incompatibilism 2. Indeterminism 3. Compatibilists
First Objection to Incompatibilism 4. Metaphysical Libertarianism 5. Three Possible Locations for Indeterminism 6. Metaphysical Libertarianism
s Underlying Theory of the Self as Pure Substance 7. Compatibilists
Renewed Randomness Objection 8. Two Problems with Metaphysical Libertarianism 9. Compatibilism and the Harmony Condition 10. Frankfurt
s Identification Theory 11. Incompatibilists: Identification Is Insufficient for Free Will 12. Traditional Compatibilism and the Ability to Do Otherwise 13. Rationality Compatibilism 14. Compatibilists Versus Metaphysical Libertarians 15. Compatibilists Versus Free Will Skeptics Conclusion Ch. 2. New Compatibilism Versus the Ought-Implies-Can Principle Introduction 1. Five Definitions of Free Will 2. Moral Responsibility 3. Frankfurt
s Argument Against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities 4. The Maxim Argument 5. The Anti-Maxim Position 6. Objections and Replies 7. Why Frankfurt
s Conclusion Defeats the Maxim Conclusion Ch. 3. Moral Responsibility Does Not Require the Power to Do Otherwise, But It Does Require at Least One Alternative Possibility Introduction 1. Three Objections to Frankfurt
s Argument Against PAP 2. David Hunt
s Blockage Argument 3. Hunt
s Neural Wall 4. Why Hunt
s Blockage Argument Fails: The Dilemma Argument Against Blockage 5. Implications for Incompatibilism Conclusion Ch. 4. The Puzzle of Responsibility Introduction 1. The Responsibility Axiom and Two Kinds of Blameless Wrongdoing 2. The Blameless Wrongdoer Argument 3. A Working Conception of Responsibility 4. The Sympathy Argument 5. Just Criminal Punishment Does Not Necessarily Require Moral Responsibility Conclusion Ch. 5. Contrary to Responsibility Skepticism, Metaphysical Libertarianism Is Metaphysically Possible Introduction 1. Responsibility Skepticism 2. The Responsibility Skeptic
s Objection to Robert Kane
s Defense of Metaphysical Libertarianism 3. Supplementing Kane
s Metaphysical Libertarianism with Susan Wolf
s Rationalist Theory of Responsibility 4. The Randomness Objection 5. One Last Defense of Metaphysical Libertarianism Over Responsibility Skepticism 6. Agent Causation Conclusion Ch. 6. The Dark Side of Metaphysical Libertarianism Introduction 1. The Self-Made-Man Postulate 2. Success Is (Almost?) Entirely a Matter of Good Luck 3. Constitutive Luck and Responsibility Skepticism 4. Situational Luck 5. Failure Is (Almost?) Entirely a Matter of Bad Luck Conclusion Ch. 7. Criminal Responsibility Does Not Require Moral Responsibility: Psychopaths Introduction 1. Psychopathy Defined A. A Working Definition of Psychopathy B. Psychological Community
s Definition C. Possible Problems with the PCL-R D. Differences between Psychopathy and Antisocial Personality Disorder 2. Three Consequentialist Reasons for Criminally Punishing Psychopaths 3. Three Arguments that Psychopaths Are Not Morally Responsible for Their Criminal Behavior A. First Argument that Psychopaths Are Not Morally Responsible for Their Criminal Behavior: Normative Incompetence B. Second Argument that Psychopaths Are Not Morally Responsible for Their Criminal Behavior: Inability To Do Otherwise C. Third Argument that Psychopaths Are Not Morally Responsible for Their Criminal Behavior: No Self-Control 4. The Insanity Defense A. Assumptions Underlying the Insanity Defense B. Different Versions of the Insanity Defense 5. Four Arguments that Psychopaths Are Insane A. First Argument that Psychopaths Are Insane B. Second Argument that Psychopaths Are Insane C. Third Argument that Psychopaths Are Insane D. Fourth Argument that Psychopaths Are Insane 6. Why the Criminal Justice System Regards Psychopaths as Criminally Responsible 7. Why Psychopaths Are Criminally Responsible Even Though They Are Not Morally Responsible A. Why Criminal Responsibility Does Not Require Moral Responsibility B. Why Moral or Emotional Understanding of the Law Is Not Necessary for Criminal Responsibility C. Psychopaths Have Sufficient Control over Their Behavior Conclusion Ch. 8. Criminal Responsibility Does Not Require Moral Responsibility: Situationism Introduction 1. The Excuses A. Stephen Morse's Dualist Theory of the Excuses B. A Monist Theory of the Excuses 2. Situationism and Moral Responsibility A. Our Nearly Universal Capacity for Cruelty B. The Dispositionism Paradox C. Situationism and Norm-Compliance D. Stanley Milgram's Shock Experiment E. Arguments for Recognizing Situationism as a Moral Excuse 3. Situationism and Criminal Responsibility 4. The Insanity Defense: Two Final Objections Conclusion Ch. 9. Addiction, Indoctrination, and Responsibility Introduction 1. Addiction 2. The "Addiction Negates Responsibility" Argument 3. Addiction Versus Weakness of Will 4. The Disease theory Is Actually Consistent with Responsibility for Addiction 5. Indoctrination 6. Doxastic Control 7. Greedy, Addict, Mr. Insane, and the Dangers of Responsibility Skepticism Conclusion