Kirk Ludwig develops a novel reductive account of plural discourse about collective action and shared intention. He argues that collective action is a matter of there being multiple agents of an event and requires no group agents, while shared intentions are distributions of intentions across members of the group.
Kirk Ludwig develops a novel reductive account of plural discourse about collective action and shared intention. He argues that collective action is a matter of there being multiple agents of an event and requires no group agents, while shared intentions are distributions of intentions across members of the group.
Kirk Ludwig is a Professor in the Philosophy Department and the Cognitive Science Program at Indiana University, Bloomington. He taught at the University of Florida from 1990 to 2010 and was the Colonel Alan R. and Margaret G. Crow CLAS Term Professor from 2008 to 2010, when he joined Indiana University, Bloomington. He works primarily in the Philosophy of Mind and Action, Philosophy of Language, and Epistemology. He is the editor of Donald Davidson (CUP, 2003), co-author with Ernie Lepore of Donald Davidson: Meaning, Truth, Language, and Reality (OUP, 2005) and Donald Davidson's Truth-theoretic Semantics (OUP, 2007), and co-editor with Ernie Lepore of Companion to Donald Davidson (Wiley-Blackwell, 2013).
Inhaltsangabe
Preface 1: The Problem of Collective Agency Part I: Singular Action Sentences 2: What is an Event? 3: The Logical Form of Singular Action Sentences 4: Action, Motivation, Explanation, and Intention 5: Conditional Intentions 6: What is it to be the agent of an event or state? 7: The Content of I-intentions 8: The Adverb 'Intentionally' Part I: Summary and Conclusion Part II - Plural Action Sentences 9: Logical Form of Plural Action Sentences 10: Extensions and Explanations 11: Consequences, Collective Actions, Illustrative Cases 12: What are Shared or Group Intentions? 13: The Distinctive Content of We-Intentions 14: Some Initial Objections and Replies 15: Collective Intentional Behavior 16: Relation to Other Accounts 17: Does the Account Require More of Collective Action than is Reasonable? Part II: Summary 18: Conclusion Bibliography Index
Preface 1: The Problem of Collective Agency Part I: Singular Action Sentences 2: What is an Event? 3: The Logical Form of Singular Action Sentences 4: Action, Motivation, Explanation, and Intention 5: Conditional Intentions 6: What is it to be the agent of an event or state? 7: The Content of I-intentions 8: The Adverb 'Intentionally' Part I: Summary and Conclusion Part II - Plural Action Sentences 9: Logical Form of Plural Action Sentences 10: Extensions and Explanations 11: Consequences, Collective Actions, Illustrative Cases 12: What are Shared or Group Intentions? 13: The Distinctive Content of We-Intentions 14: Some Initial Objections and Replies 15: Collective Intentional Behavior 16: Relation to Other Accounts 17: Does the Account Require More of Collective Action than is Reasonable? Part II: Summary 18: Conclusion Bibliography Index
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