This book presents a strong case for substance dualism and offers a comprehensive defense of the knowledge argument, showing that materialism cannot accommodate or explain the 'hard problem' of consciousness. Bringing together the discussion of reductionism and semantic vagueness in an original and illuminating way, Howard Robinson argues that non-fundamental levels of ontology are best treated by a conceptualist account, rather than a realist one. In addition to discussing the standard versions of physicalism, he examines physicalist theories such as those of McDowell and Price, and accounts…mehr
This book presents a strong case for substance dualism and offers a comprehensive defense of the knowledge argument, showing that materialism cannot accommodate or explain the 'hard problem' of consciousness. Bringing together the discussion of reductionism and semantic vagueness in an original and illuminating way, Howard Robinson argues that non-fundamental levels of ontology are best treated by a conceptualist account, rather than a realist one. In addition to discussing the standard versions of physicalism, he examines physicalist theories such as those of McDowell and Price, and accounts of neutral monism and panpsychism from Strawson, McGinn and Stoljar. He also explores previously unnoticed historical parallels between Frege and Aristotle and between Hume and Plotinus. His book will be a valuable resource for scholars and advanced students of philosophy of mind, in particular those looking at consciousness, dualism, and the mind-body problem.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Howard Robinson, a native Coloradan, was educated at Brigham Young University and at the State University of New York. He has been a teacher, a market research analyst, a regional sales representative, and a corporate manager. He was an employee of the LDS Church for twenty-seven years in various Regional and Area offices. In connection with these assignments, he and his family spent nearly ten years living overseas in Ecuador, Peru, Mexico and the Philippines. He and his wife, Maryetta, have had four children and (to date) sixteen grandchildren. He continues to live in the city of Jacob Martin.
Inhaltsangabe
Part I. The Power of the Knowledge Argument: 1. Introducing the knowledge argument 2. Dennett's denial of Mary's ignorance 3. The abilities hypothesis and other functionalist strategies 4. Why Frank should not have jilted Mary: the inadequacy of representationalism as a strategy against KA 5. The phenomenal concept strategy: more enigma than argument 6. Davidson, non-reductive physicalism and naturalism without physicalism 7. Mysterianism, neutral monism and panpsychism 8. Conclusion: the real power of the knowledge argument - qualia, qualities and our conception of the physical world Part II. Why Physicalism Entails Epiphenomenalism: 9. Reductionism and the status of the special sciences 10. Vagueness, realism, language and thought 11. Composite objects, the special sciences, conceptualism and realism 12. Why there are (probably) no physical individuals 13. Dennett and the human perspective Part III. Arguments for Mental Substance: 14. Some current arguments for substance dualism 15. An argument for the existence of mental substance 16. Plotinus, Locke and Hume on the unity of individual substances Bibliography Index.
Part I. The Power of the Knowledge Argument: 1. Introducing the knowledge argument 2. Dennett's denial of Mary's ignorance 3. The abilities hypothesis and other functionalist strategies 4. Why Frank should not have jilted Mary: the inadequacy of representationalism as a strategy against KA 5. The phenomenal concept strategy: more enigma than argument 6. Davidson, non-reductive physicalism and naturalism without physicalism 7. Mysterianism, neutral monism and panpsychism 8. Conclusion: the real power of the knowledge argument - qualia, qualities and our conception of the physical world Part II. Why Physicalism Entails Epiphenomenalism: 9. Reductionism and the status of the special sciences 10. Vagueness, realism, language and thought 11. Composite objects, the special sciences, conceptualism and realism 12. Why there are (probably) no physical individuals 13. Dennett and the human perspective Part III. Arguments for Mental Substance: 14. Some current arguments for substance dualism 15. An argument for the existence of mental substance 16. Plotinus, Locke and Hume on the unity of individual substances Bibliography Index.
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