This study deals with providing force protection for the Navy's future, minimally manned surface combatants. Following the attack on the USS Cole, force protection became the Navy's primary warfare concern. In order to add experience and defensive depth, United States Coast Guard Port Security Units augmented Navy ships' force assets in providing Antiterrorism and Force Protection. Concurrently, the Navy set out to build the next family of surface combatants, the DD (X) class. One of the cornerstones of the program, as specified in the operational requirements document (ORD), is that the DD (X) have an "optimally sized" crew of 95, not to exceed 150. This is nearly a 70 percent reduction from surface combatant crew sizes of today. How can the Navy reasonably expect to provide force protection for minimally manned combatants when it is having trouble doing so today? This study examines the tasks required to provide adequate force protection, the manning required to perform those tasks, and the associated manning costs. The analysis determined that the new DD (X) class will only be able to perform the force protection tasks if manned near the 150 personnel mark, and even then will require a security augmentation force, such as a Port Security Unit.