Y. Narahari, Dinesh Garg, Ramasuri Narayanam

Game Theoretic Problems in Network Economics and Mechanism Design Solutions

• Broschiertes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

With the advent of the Internet and other modern information and communication technologies, a magnificent opportunity has opened up for introducing new, innovative models of commerce, markets, and business. Creating these innovations calls for significant interdisciplinary interaction among researchers in computer science, communication networks, operations research, economics, mathematics, sociology, and management science. In the emerging era of new problems and challenges, one particular tool that has found widespread applications is mechanism design.

The focus of this book is to explore game theoretic modeling and mechanism design for problem solving in Internet and network economics. It provides a sound foundation of relevant concepts and theory, to help apply mechanism design to problem solving in a rigorous way.

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Produktdetails

• Advanced Information and Knowledge Processing
• Verlag: Springer / Springer London / Springer, Berlin
• Artikelnr. des Verlages: 978-1-84996-807-2
• Softcover reprint of hardcover 1st ed. 2009
• Seitenzahl: 296
• Erscheinungstermin: 22. Oktober 2010
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 235mm x 155mm x 17mm
• Gewicht: 448g
• ISBN-13: 9781849968072
• ISBN-10: 1849968071
• Artikelnr.: 32919461

Inhaltsangabe

From the contents Motivating Problems in Network Economics.- Foundations of Mechanisms Design.- Strategic Form Games.- Dominant Strategy Equilibria.- Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium.- Bayesian Games.- Social Choice Functions.- Incentive Compatibility and the Revelation Theorem.- Properties of Social Choice Functions.- Bayesian Implementation.- Revenue Equivalence Theorem.- Mechanism Design for Sponsored Search Auctions.- Internet Advertising.- Sponsored Search Auction.- Individual Rationality.- Computational Complexity.- Mechanism Design for Resource Procurement in Grid Computing.- The G-DSIC Mechanism.- The G-BIC Mechanism.- G-OPT: An Optimal Auction Mechanism.- Incentive Compatible Broadcast Protocols for Ad hoc Networks with Selfish Nodes.- Ad hoc Networks with Selfish Nodes.- Relevant Work on Incentive Compatible Protocols.- A Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible Broadcast Protocol.- A Bayesian Incentive Compatible Broadcast (BIC-B) Protocol.- Key Applications Areas.

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From the contents Motivating Problems in Network Economics.- Foundations of Mechanisms Design.- Strategic Form Games.- Dominant Strategy Equilibria.- Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium.- Bayesian Games.- Social Choice Functions.- Incentive Compatibility and the Revelation Theorem.- Properties of Social Choice Functions.- Bayesian Implementation.- Revenue Equivalence Theorem.- Mechanism Design for Sponsored Search Auctions.- Internet Advertising.- Sponsored Search Auction.- Individual Rationality.- Computational Complexity.- Mechanism Design for Resource Procurement in Grid Computing.- The G-DSIC Mechanism.- The G-BIC Mechanism.- G-OPT: An Optimal Auction Mechanism.- Incentive Compatible Broadcast Protocols for Ad hoc Networks with Selfish Nodes.- Ad hoc Networks with Selfish Nodes.- Relevant Work on Incentive Compatible Protocols.- A Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible Broadcast Protocol.- A Bayesian Incentive Compatible Broadcast (BIC-B) Protocol.- Key Applications Areas.

Rezensionen

From the reviews: "The book consists of six chapters. ... This is one of the first monographs that deals solely with algorithmic mechanism design. ... it will be useful to researchers in computer science, operations research, e-commerce, and multiagent systems. The book is also suitable for an advanced undergraduate or graduate-level course in computer science and operations research. ... In any case, the book will be a valuable resource for academics and researchers." (Haris Aziz, ACM Computing Reviews, April, 2009)

"The book consists of six chapters. ... This is one of the first monographs that deals solely with algorithmic mechanism design. ... it will be useful to researchers in computer science, operations research, e-commerce, and multiagent systems. The book is also suitable for an advanced undergraduate or graduate-level course in computer science and operations research. ... In any case, the book will be a valuable resource for academics and researchers." (Haris Aziz, ACM Computing Reviews, April, 2009)