A mathematically-oriented, comprehensive textbook in game theory for students in Mathematics, Economics, and Engineering, at both undergraduate and graduate levels, this new edition is unrivalled in the breadth of its coverage, the thoroughness of the technical explanations and the inclusion of numerous exercises and worked examples.
A mathematically-oriented, comprehensive textbook in game theory for students in Mathematics, Economics, and Engineering, at both undergraduate and graduate levels, this new edition is unrivalled in the breadth of its coverage, the thoroughness of the technical explanations and the inclusion of numerous exercises and worked examples.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Michael Maschler was a Professor at the Einstein Institute of Mathematics and the Center for the Study of Rationality at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel. He greatly contributed to cooperative game theory and to repeated games with incomplete information.
Inhaltsangabe
1. The game of chess 2. Utility theory 3. Extensive-form games 4. Strategic-form games 5. Mixed strategies 6. Behavior strategies and Kuhn's theorem 7. Equilibrium refinements 8. Correlated equilibria 9. Games with incomplete information and common priors 10. Games with incomplete information: the general model 11. The universal belief space 12. Auctions 13. Repeated games 14. Repeated games with vector payoffs 15. Social choice 16. Bargaining games 17. Coalitional games with transferable utility 18. The core 19. The Shapley value 20. The bargaining set 21. The nucleolus 22. Stable matching 23. Appendices.
1. The game of chess 2. Utility theory 3. Extensive-form games 4. Strategic-form games 5. Mixed strategies 6. Behavior strategies and Kuhn's theorem 7. Equilibrium refinements 8. Correlated equilibria 9. Games with incomplete information and common priors 10. Games with incomplete information: the general model 11. The universal belief space 12. Auctions 13. Repeated games 14. Repeated games with vector payoffs 15. Social choice 16. Bargaining games 17. Coalitional games with transferable utility 18. The core 19. The Shapley value 20. The bargaining set 21. The nucleolus 22. Stable matching 23. Appendices.
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