Michael Maschler, Eilon Solan, Shmuel Zamir

Game Theory

• Broschiertes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

A mathematically-oriented, comprehensive textbook in game theory for students in Mathematics, Economics, and Engineering, at both undergraduate and graduate levels, this new edition is unrivalled in the breadth of its coverage, the thoroughness of the technical explanations and the inclusion of numerous exercises and worked examples.

Produktdetails

• Verlag: Cambridge University Press
• 2., überarb. Aufl.
• Seitenzahl: 1052
• Erscheinungstermin: 25. März 2024
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 246mm x 189mm x 56mm
• Gewicht: 2240g
• ISBN-13: 9781108825146
• ISBN-10: 1108825141
• Artikelnr.: 59514555

Autorenporträt

Michael Maschler was a Professor at the Einstein Institute of Mathematics and the Center for the Study of Rationality at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel. He greatly contributed to cooperative game theory and to repeated games with incomplete information.

Inhaltsangabe

1. The game of chess; 2. Utility theory; 3. Extensive-form games; 4. Strategic-form games; 5. Mixed strategies; 6. Behavior strategies and Kuhn's theorem; 7. Equilibrium refinements; 8. Correlated equilibria; 9. Games with incomplete information and common priors; 10. Games with incomplete information: the general model; 11. The universal belief space; 12. Auctions; 13. Repeated games; 14. Repeated games with vector payoffs; 15. Social choice; 16. Bargaining games; 17. Coalitional games with transferable utility; 18. The core; 19. The Shapley value; 20. The bargaining set; 21. The nucleolus; 22. Stable matching; 23. Appendices.

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1. The game of chess
2. Utility theory
3. Extensive-form games
4. Strategic-form games
5. Mixed strategies
6. Behavior strategies and Kuhn's theorem
7. Equilibrium refinements
8. Correlated equilibria
9. Games with incomplete information and common priors
10. Games with incomplete information: the general model
11. The universal belief space
12. Auctions
13. Repeated games
14. Repeated games with vector payoffs
15. Social choice
16. Bargaining games
17. Coalitional games with transferable utility
18. The core
19. The Shapley value
20. The bargaining set
21. The nucleolus
22. Stable matching
23. Appendices.

Rezensionen

Praise for first edition: 'This is the book for which the world has been waiting for decades: a definitive, comprehensive account of the mathematical theory of games, by three of the world's biggest experts on the subject. Rigorous yet eminently readable, deep yet comprehensible, replete with a large variety of important real-world applications, it will remain the standard reference in game theory for a very long time.' Robert Aumann, Nobel Laureate in Economics, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem