Games in Management Science
Essays in Honor of Georges Zaccour
Herausgegeben:Pineau, Pierre-Olivier; Sigué, Simon; Taboubi, Sihem
Games in Management Science
Essays in Honor of Georges Zaccour
Herausgegeben:Pineau, Pierre-Olivier; Sigué, Simon; Taboubi, Sihem
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This book covers a large spectrum of cutting-edge game theory applications in management science in which Professor Georges Zaccour has made significant contributions. The book consists of 21 chapters and highlights the latest treatments of game theory in various areas, including marketing, supply chains, energy and environmental management, and cyber defense. With this book, former Ph.D. students and successful research collaborators of Professor Zaccour wish to honor his many scientific achievements.
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This book covers a large spectrum of cutting-edge game theory applications in management science in which Professor Georges Zaccour has made significant contributions. The book consists of 21 chapters and highlights the latest treatments of game theory in various areas, including marketing, supply chains, energy and environmental management, and cyber defense. With this book, former Ph.D. students and successful research collaborators of Professor Zaccour wish to honor his many scientific achievements.
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- International Series in Operations Research & Management Science 280
- Verlag: Springer / Springer International Publishing / Springer, Berlin
- Artikelnr. des Verlages: 978-3-030-19106-1
- 1st ed. 2020
- Seitenzahl: 436
- Erscheinungstermin: 30. August 2019
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 241mm x 160mm x 29mm
- Gewicht: 802g
- ISBN-13: 9783030191061
- ISBN-10: 3030191060
- Artikelnr.: 55968832
- International Series in Operations Research & Management Science 280
- Verlag: Springer / Springer International Publishing / Springer, Berlin
- Artikelnr. des Verlages: 978-3-030-19106-1
- 1st ed. 2020
- Seitenzahl: 436
- Erscheinungstermin: 30. August 2019
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 241mm x 160mm x 29mm
- Gewicht: 802g
- ISBN-13: 9783030191061
- ISBN-10: 3030191060
- Artikelnr.: 55968832
Pierre-Olivier Pineau is a full professor in the Department of Decision Sciences at HEC Montréal and has held the Chair of Energy Sector Management since December 2013. He is a specialist in energy policy, particularly in the electricity sector. His research focuses on the integration of electricity markets in Canada and around the world, as well as optimal approaches to balancing production and energy consumption. He has worked in Finland, Peru and Cameroon on energy policy issues. He is a member of the Board of Directors of the Canadian Energy Economics Association. He is a member of the CIRODD (Interuniversity Research Center on the Operationalization of Sustainable Development) and a Fellow at CIRANO (Center for Interuniversity Research and Analysis of Organizations). Prior to joining HEC Montréal, he was a professor at the University of Victoria (BC) from 2001 to 2006. Simon P. Sigué is a professor of marketing at Athabasca University, Canada. His research covers such topics as franchising, marketing channel, customer relationship management, international marketing and trade, and corruption. It has been published in various economics, management science, and marketing journals, including European Journal of Operational Research, International Journal of Production Economics, Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control, Journal of Retailing, Journal of Service Research, and Omega: The International Journal of Management Science. He is also the President of the Academy of African Business and Development and past editor of Journal of African Business. Sihem Taboubi holds a Ph.D. in Administration and a M.Sc. in marketing from HEC Montreal. She is a Professor of marketing at HEC Montreal and a member of the Group of Research in Decision Analysis (GERAD) and the International Society of Dynamic Games (ISDG). Her main research covers applications of game theory in marketing and supply chains. More particularly, she uses optimal control, static games and differential games to examine pricing, advertising and promotions decisions in distribution channels. Her research in published in various prestigious journals in Management Science and Marketing. Professor Taboubi serves as a referee for several Journals interested in the applications of game theory in these research areas.
Chapter 1. A Lanchester-Type Dynamic Game of Advertising and Pricing.- Chapter 2. On the Modelling of Price Effects in the Diffusion of Optional Contingent Products.- Chapter 3. The effects of consumer rebates in a competitive distribution channel.- Chapter 4. On the coordination of static and dynamic marketing channels in a duopoly with advertising.- Chapter 5. Product Recalls and Channel Pricing.- Chapter 6. Coordination in Closed-loop supply chain with price-dependent returns.- Chapter 7. A steady-state game of a net-zero emission climate regime.- Chapter 8. Dynamic Models of the Firm with Green Energy and Goodwill with a Constant Size of the Output Market.- Chapter 9. A Review of Experiments on Dynamic Games in Environmental and Resource Economics.- Chapter 10. Managerial incentives and polluting inputs under imperfect competition.- Chapter 11. Non-linear incentive equilibrium strategies for a transboundary pollution differential game.- Chapter 12. Strategic interaction among firms in output and emission markets: a unified framework.- Chapter 13. Human vs River: Cooperation in Environmental Games through Environmental Personhood.- Chapter 14. A dynamic game with interaction between Kantian players and Nashian players.- Chapter 15. Frugals, Militants and the Oil Market.- Chapter 16. Compliance with social norms as an evolutionary stable equilibrium.- Chapter 17. Building E cient Institutions: A Two-Stage Differential Game.- Chapter 18. Game theory and cyber defence.- Chapter 19. A LQ vaccine communication game.- Chapter 20. On the Stability of a Two-Player International Environmental Agreement with Intra-Industry Trade.- Chapter 21. Stable coalition structures in dynamic competitive environment.
Chapter 1. A Lanchester-Type Dynamic Game of Advertising and Pricing.- Chapter 2. On the Modelling of Price Effects in the Diffusion of Optional Contingent Products.- Chapter 3. The effects of consumer rebates in a competitive distribution channel.- Chapter 4. On the coordination of static and dynamic marketing channels in a duopoly with advertising.- Chapter 5. Product Recalls and Channel Pricing.- Chapter 6. Coordination in Closed-loop supply chain with price-dependent returns.- Chapter 7. A steady-state game of a net-zero emission climate regime.- Chapter 8. Dynamic Models of the Firm with Green Energy and Goodwill with a Constant Size of the Output Market.- Chapter 9. A Review of Experiments on Dynamic Games in Environmental and Resource Economics.- Chapter 10. Managerial incentives and polluting inputs under imperfect competition.- Chapter 11. Non-linear incentive equilibrium strategies for a transboundary pollution differential game.- Chapter 12. Strategic interaction among firms in output and emission markets: a unified framework.- Chapter 13. Human vs River: Cooperation in Environmental Games through Environmental Personhood.- Chapter 14. A dynamic game with interaction between Kantian players and Nashian players.- Chapter 15. Frugals, Militants and the Oil Market.- Chapter 16. Compliance with social norms as an evolutionary stable equilibrium.- Chapter 17. Building E cient Institutions: A Two-Stage Differential Game.- Chapter 18. Game theory and cyber defence.- Chapter 19. A LQ vaccine communication game.- Chapter 20. On the Stability of a Two-Player International Environmental Agreement with Intra-Industry Trade.- Chapter 21. Stable coalition structures in dynamic competitive environment.
Chapter 1. A Lanchester-Type Dynamic Game of Advertising and Pricing.- Chapter 2. On the Modelling of Price Effects in the Diffusion of Optional Contingent Products.- Chapter 3. The effects of consumer rebates in a competitive distribution channel.- Chapter 4. On the coordination of static and dynamic marketing channels in a duopoly with advertising.- Chapter 5. Product Recalls and Channel Pricing.- Chapter 6. Coordination in Closed-loop supply chain with price-dependent returns.- Chapter 7. A steady-state game of a net-zero emission climate regime.- Chapter 8. Dynamic Models of the Firm with Green Energy and Goodwill with a Constant Size of the Output Market.- Chapter 9. A Review of Experiments on Dynamic Games in Environmental and Resource Economics.- Chapter 10. Managerial incentives and polluting inputs under imperfect competition.- Chapter 11. Non-linear incentive equilibrium strategies for a transboundary pollution differential game.- Chapter 12. Strategic interaction among firms in output and emission markets: a unified framework.- Chapter 13. Human vs River: Cooperation in Environmental Games through Environmental Personhood.- Chapter 14. A dynamic game with interaction between Kantian players and Nashian players.- Chapter 15. Frugals, Militants and the Oil Market.- Chapter 16. Compliance with social norms as an evolutionary stable equilibrium.- Chapter 17. Building E cient Institutions: A Two-Stage Differential Game.- Chapter 18. Game theory and cyber defence.- Chapter 19. A LQ vaccine communication game.- Chapter 20. On the Stability of a Two-Player International Environmental Agreement with Intra-Industry Trade.- Chapter 21. Stable coalition structures in dynamic competitive environment.
Chapter 1. A Lanchester-Type Dynamic Game of Advertising and Pricing.- Chapter 2. On the Modelling of Price Effects in the Diffusion of Optional Contingent Products.- Chapter 3. The effects of consumer rebates in a competitive distribution channel.- Chapter 4. On the coordination of static and dynamic marketing channels in a duopoly with advertising.- Chapter 5. Product Recalls and Channel Pricing.- Chapter 6. Coordination in Closed-loop supply chain with price-dependent returns.- Chapter 7. A steady-state game of a net-zero emission climate regime.- Chapter 8. Dynamic Models of the Firm with Green Energy and Goodwill with a Constant Size of the Output Market.- Chapter 9. A Review of Experiments on Dynamic Games in Environmental and Resource Economics.- Chapter 10. Managerial incentives and polluting inputs under imperfect competition.- Chapter 11. Non-linear incentive equilibrium strategies for a transboundary pollution differential game.- Chapter 12. Strategic interaction among firms in output and emission markets: a unified framework.- Chapter 13. Human vs River: Cooperation in Environmental Games through Environmental Personhood.- Chapter 14. A dynamic game with interaction between Kantian players and Nashian players.- Chapter 15. Frugals, Militants and the Oil Market.- Chapter 16. Compliance with social norms as an evolutionary stable equilibrium.- Chapter 17. Building E cient Institutions: A Two-Stage Differential Game.- Chapter 18. Game theory and cyber defence.- Chapter 19. A LQ vaccine communication game.- Chapter 20. On the Stability of a Two-Player International Environmental Agreement with Intra-Industry Trade.- Chapter 21. Stable coalition structures in dynamic competitive environment.