Goldman and His Critics presents a series of original essays contributed by influential philosophers who critically examine Alvin Goldman's work, followed by Goldman's responses to each essay. * Critiques Alvin Goldman's groundbreaking theories, writings, and ideas on a range of philosophical topics * Features contributions from some of the most important and influential contemporary philosophers * Covers Goldman's views on epistemology--both individual and social--in addition to cognitive science and metaphysics * Pays special attention to Goldman's writings on philosophy of mind, including the evolution of his thoughts on Simulation-Theory (ST)…mehr
Goldman and His Critics presents a series of original essays contributed by influential philosophers who critically examine Alvin Goldman's work, followed by Goldman's responses to each essay. * Critiques Alvin Goldman's groundbreaking theories, writings, and ideas on a range of philosophical topics * Features contributions from some of the most important and influential contemporary philosophers * Covers Goldman's views on epistemology--both individual and social--in addition to cognitive science and metaphysics * Pays special attention to Goldman's writings on philosophy of mind, including the evolution of his thoughts on Simulation-Theory (ST)Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Hilary Kornblith is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA. He is the author of Inductive Inference and its Natural Ground (1993); Knowledge and its Place in Nature (2002); On Reflection (2012); and A Naturalistic Epistemology: Selected Papers (2014). Brian P. McLaughlin is a Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and Cognitive Science at Rutgers University, New Jersey. He has published numerous articles on topics relating to the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of psychology, and metaphysics.
Inhaltsangabe
List of Contributors vii Foreword ix Alvin I. Goldman Preface x Part I Reliabilism, Internalism, and Externalism 1 1 Internalism, Reliabilism, and Deontology 3 Michael Williams Reply to Michael Williams 2 Goldman against Internalism 22 Laurence BonJour Reply to BonJour 3 Historical versus Current Time Slice Theories in Epistemology 43 Thomas Kelly Reply to Kelly 4 The Justification of Memory Beliefs: Evidentialism, Reliabilism, Conservatism 69 Matthew McGrath Reply to McGrath 5 Unreliable Testimony 88 Elizabeth Fricker Reply to Fricker Part II Epistemological Trouble-Shooting and Social Epistemology 125 6 Process Reliabilism and Virtue Epistemology 127 Ernest Sosa Reply to Sosa 7 Goldman on Evidence and Reliability 149 Jack C. Lyons Reply to Lyons 8 A Naturalistic Approach to the Generality Problem 178 Erik J. Olsson Reply to Olsson 9 Veritism and Epistemic Value 200 Duncan Pritchard Reply to Pritchard 10 The Condorcet Jury Theorem and Voter?-Specific Truth 219 Christian List and Kai Spiekermann Reply to List and Spiekermann Part III Cognitive Science, Philosophy of Mind, and Metaphysics 235 11 Knowledge and Reliability 237 Jennifer Nagel Reply to Nagel 12 Goldman on Knowledge of Mind 259 Christopher S. Hill Reply to Hill 13 Under Influence: Is Altercentric Bias Compatible with Simulation Theory? 280 Frédérique de Vignemont and Hugo Mercier Reply to Vignemont and Mercier 14 Finding the Body in the Brain: From Simulation Theory to Embodied Simulation 297 Vittorio Gallese Reply to Gallese 15 Embodiment in Perception: Will We Know It When We See It? 318 Chaz Firestone Reply to Firestone 16 Cognitive Science and Metaphysics: Partners in Debunking 337 Jonathan Schaffer Reply to Schaffer Appendix: Alvin Goldman's Publications 369 Index 379
List of Contributors vii Foreword ix Alvin I. Goldman Preface x Part I Reliabilism, Internalism, and Externalism 1 1 Internalism, Reliabilism, and Deontology 3 Michael Williams Reply to Michael Williams 2 Goldman against Internalism 22 Laurence BonJour Reply to BonJour 3 Historical versus Current Time Slice Theories in Epistemology 43 Thomas Kelly Reply to Kelly 4 The Justification of Memory Beliefs: Evidentialism, Reliabilism, Conservatism 69 Matthew McGrath Reply to McGrath 5 Unreliable Testimony 88 Elizabeth Fricker Reply to Fricker Part II Epistemological Trouble-Shooting and Social Epistemology 125 6 Process Reliabilism and Virtue Epistemology 127 Ernest Sosa Reply to Sosa 7 Goldman on Evidence and Reliability 149 Jack C. Lyons Reply to Lyons 8 A Naturalistic Approach to the Generality Problem 178 Erik J. Olsson Reply to Olsson 9 Veritism and Epistemic Value 200 Duncan Pritchard Reply to Pritchard 10 The Condorcet Jury Theorem and Voter?-Specific Truth 219 Christian List and Kai Spiekermann Reply to List and Spiekermann Part III Cognitive Science, Philosophy of Mind, and Metaphysics 235 11 Knowledge and Reliability 237 Jennifer Nagel Reply to Nagel 12 Goldman on Knowledge of Mind 259 Christopher S. Hill Reply to Hill 13 Under Influence: Is Altercentric Bias Compatible with Simulation Theory? 280 Frédérique de Vignemont and Hugo Mercier Reply to Vignemont and Mercier 14 Finding the Body in the Brain: From Simulation Theory to Embodied Simulation 297 Vittorio Gallese Reply to Gallese 15 Embodiment in Perception: Will We Know It When We See It? 318 Chaz Firestone Reply to Firestone 16 Cognitive Science and Metaphysics: Partners in Debunking 337 Jonathan Schaffer Reply to Schaffer Appendix: Alvin Goldman's Publications 369 Index 379
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