Group Formation in Economics
Networks, Clubs, and Coalitions
Herausgeber: Demange, Gabrielle; Wooders, Myrna
Group Formation in Economics
Networks, Clubs, and Coalitions
Herausgeber: Demange, Gabrielle; Wooders, Myrna
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This volume introduces the reader to game-theoretic treatments of group formation.
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This volume introduces the reader to game-theoretic treatments of group formation.
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Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Cambridge University Press
- Seitenzahl: 494
- Erscheinungstermin: 4. Mai 2012
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 234mm x 156mm x 27mm
- Gewicht: 743g
- ISBN-13: 9781107407381
- ISBN-10: 1107407389
- Artikelnr.: 36198649
- Herstellerkennzeichnung
- Books on Demand GmbH
- In de Tarpen 42
- 22848 Norderstedt
- info@bod.de
- 040 53433511
- Verlag: Cambridge University Press
- Seitenzahl: 494
- Erscheinungstermin: 4. Mai 2012
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 234mm x 156mm x 27mm
- Gewicht: 743g
- ISBN-13: 9781107407381
- ISBN-10: 1107407389
- Artikelnr.: 36198649
- Herstellerkennzeichnung
- Books on Demand GmbH
- In de Tarpen 42
- 22848 Norderstedt
- info@bod.de
- 040 53433511
Part I. Strategic Approach to Network Formation: 1. A survey of models of
network formation: stability and efficiency Matthew O. Jackson; 2. Models
of network formation in cooperative games Anne van den Nouweland; 3.
Farsighted stability in network formation Frank H. Page, Jr and Samir
Kamat; 4. Learning in networks Sanjeev Goyal; Part II. On Equilibrium
Formation of Groups: A Theoretical Assessment: 5. Group formation: the
interaction of increasing returns and preferences diversity Gabrielle
Demange; 6. Games and economies with near exhaustion of gains to scale
Alexander Kovalenkov and Myrna Wooders; 7. Coalitions and clubs: Tiebout
equilibrium in large economies John Conley and Stefani Smith; 8.
Secession-proof cost allocations and stable group structures Michel Le
Breton and Shlomo Weber; Part III. Groups, Clubs, Alliances in Political
and Economic Environments: 9. Political parties and coalition formation
Amrita Dhillon; 10. Design of constitutional rules: Banzhof power index,
design of rules Mika Widgren; 11. Group and network formation in industrial
organization: a survey Francis Bloch; 12. Institution design for managing
global commons: lessons from coalition theory Carlo Carraro; 13. Inequality
and growth clubs Fernando Jaramillo, Hubert Kempf and Fabien Moizeau; 14.
Informal insurance, enforcement constraints, and group formation Garance
Genicot and Debraj Ray; 15. Spontaneous market emergence and social
networks Marcel Fafchamps.
network formation: stability and efficiency Matthew O. Jackson; 2. Models
of network formation in cooperative games Anne van den Nouweland; 3.
Farsighted stability in network formation Frank H. Page, Jr and Samir
Kamat; 4. Learning in networks Sanjeev Goyal; Part II. On Equilibrium
Formation of Groups: A Theoretical Assessment: 5. Group formation: the
interaction of increasing returns and preferences diversity Gabrielle
Demange; 6. Games and economies with near exhaustion of gains to scale
Alexander Kovalenkov and Myrna Wooders; 7. Coalitions and clubs: Tiebout
equilibrium in large economies John Conley and Stefani Smith; 8.
Secession-proof cost allocations and stable group structures Michel Le
Breton and Shlomo Weber; Part III. Groups, Clubs, Alliances in Political
and Economic Environments: 9. Political parties and coalition formation
Amrita Dhillon; 10. Design of constitutional rules: Banzhof power index,
design of rules Mika Widgren; 11. Group and network formation in industrial
organization: a survey Francis Bloch; 12. Institution design for managing
global commons: lessons from coalition theory Carlo Carraro; 13. Inequality
and growth clubs Fernando Jaramillo, Hubert Kempf and Fabien Moizeau; 14.
Informal insurance, enforcement constraints, and group formation Garance
Genicot and Debraj Ray; 15. Spontaneous market emergence and social
networks Marcel Fafchamps.
Part I. Strategic Approach to Network Formation: 1. A survey of models of
network formation: stability and efficiency Matthew O. Jackson; 2. Models
of network formation in cooperative games Anne van den Nouweland; 3.
Farsighted stability in network formation Frank H. Page, Jr and Samir
Kamat; 4. Learning in networks Sanjeev Goyal; Part II. On Equilibrium
Formation of Groups: A Theoretical Assessment: 5. Group formation: the
interaction of increasing returns and preferences diversity Gabrielle
Demange; 6. Games and economies with near exhaustion of gains to scale
Alexander Kovalenkov and Myrna Wooders; 7. Coalitions and clubs: Tiebout
equilibrium in large economies John Conley and Stefani Smith; 8.
Secession-proof cost allocations and stable group structures Michel Le
Breton and Shlomo Weber; Part III. Groups, Clubs, Alliances in Political
and Economic Environments: 9. Political parties and coalition formation
Amrita Dhillon; 10. Design of constitutional rules: Banzhof power index,
design of rules Mika Widgren; 11. Group and network formation in industrial
organization: a survey Francis Bloch; 12. Institution design for managing
global commons: lessons from coalition theory Carlo Carraro; 13. Inequality
and growth clubs Fernando Jaramillo, Hubert Kempf and Fabien Moizeau; 14.
Informal insurance, enforcement constraints, and group formation Garance
Genicot and Debraj Ray; 15. Spontaneous market emergence and social
networks Marcel Fafchamps.
network formation: stability and efficiency Matthew O. Jackson; 2. Models
of network formation in cooperative games Anne van den Nouweland; 3.
Farsighted stability in network formation Frank H. Page, Jr and Samir
Kamat; 4. Learning in networks Sanjeev Goyal; Part II. On Equilibrium
Formation of Groups: A Theoretical Assessment: 5. Group formation: the
interaction of increasing returns and preferences diversity Gabrielle
Demange; 6. Games and economies with near exhaustion of gains to scale
Alexander Kovalenkov and Myrna Wooders; 7. Coalitions and clubs: Tiebout
equilibrium in large economies John Conley and Stefani Smith; 8.
Secession-proof cost allocations and stable group structures Michel Le
Breton and Shlomo Weber; Part III. Groups, Clubs, Alliances in Political
and Economic Environments: 9. Political parties and coalition formation
Amrita Dhillon; 10. Design of constitutional rules: Banzhof power index,
design of rules Mika Widgren; 11. Group and network formation in industrial
organization: a survey Francis Bloch; 12. Institution design for managing
global commons: lessons from coalition theory Carlo Carraro; 13. Inequality
and growth clubs Fernando Jaramillo, Hubert Kempf and Fabien Moizeau; 14.
Informal insurance, enforcement constraints, and group formation Garance
Genicot and Debraj Ray; 15. Spontaneous market emergence and social
networks Marcel Fafchamps.