R.J. Aumann / S. Hart (eds.)

Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications

Volume 2
Herausgeber: Aumann, R J; Hart, S.

• Gebundenes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

This is the second of three volumes surveying the state of the art in Game Theory and its applications to many and varied fields, in particular to economics. The chapters in the present volume are contributed by outstanding authorities, and provide comprehensive coverage and precise statements of the main results in each area. The applications include empirical evidence. The following topics are covered: communication and correlated equilibria, coalitional games and coalition structures, utility and subjective probability, common knowledge, bargaining, zero-sum games, differential games, and applications of game theory to signalling, moral hazard, search, evolutionary biology, international relations, voting procedures, social choice, public economics, politics, and cost allocation. This handbook will be of interest to scholars in economics, political science, psychology, mathematics and biology. For more information on the Handbooks in Economics series, please see our home page on

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Produktdetails

• Verlag: Elsevier Science
• Seitenzahl: 818
• Erscheinungstermin: 21. Dezember 1994
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 245mm x 169mm x 39mm
• Gewicht: 1615g
• ISBN-13: 9780444894274
• ISBN-10: 0444894276
• Artikelnr.: 23438179

Inhaltsangabe

Zero-sum two-person games (T.E.S. Raghavan). Game theory and statistics (G.
Schwarz). Differential games (A. Friedman). Differential games - economic
applications (S. Clemhout, H.Y. Wan, Jr.). Communication, correlated
equilibria, and incentive compatibility (R.B. Myerson). Signalling (D.M.
Kreps, J. Sobel). Moral hazard (P.K. Dutta, R. Radner). Search (J.
McMillan, M. Rothschild). Game theory and evolutionary biology (P.
Hammerstein, R. Selten). Game theory models of peace and war (B. O'Neill).
Voting procedures (S.J. Brams). Social choice (H. Moulin). Power and
stability in politics (P.D. Straffin, Jr.). Game theory and public
economics (M. Kurz). Cost allocation (H.P. Young). Cooperative models of
bargaining (W. Thomson). Games in coalitional form (R.J. Weber). Coalition
structures (J. Greenberg). Game-theoretic aspects of computing (N. Linial).
Utility and subjective probability (P.C. Fishburn). Common knowledge (J.
Geanakoplos). Index.