Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications

Herausgeber: Aumann, R J; Hart, S.

• Broschiertes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

This is the first volume of the Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, to be followed by two additional volumes. Game Theory has developed greatly in the last decade, and today it is an essential tool in much of economic theory. The three volumes will cover the fundamental theoretical aspects, a wide range of applications to economics, several chapters on applications to political science, and individual chapters on relations with other disciplines. The topics covered in the present volume include chess-playing computers, an introduction to the non-cooperative theory, repeated games, bargaining theory, auctions, location, entry deterrence, patents, the cooperative theory and its applications, and the relation between Game Theory and ethics. For more information on the Handbooks in Economics series, please see our home page on

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Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.

Produktdetails

• Verlag: Elsevier Science
• Seitenzahl: 760
• Erscheinungstermin: 27. Dezember 1992
• Englisch
• ISBN-13: 9781493302703
• ISBN-10: 1493302701
• Artikelnr.: 41642330

Inhaltsangabe

The Game of chess (H.A. Simon, J. Schaeffer). Games in extensive and
strategic forms (S. Hart). Games with perfect information (J. Mycielski).
Repeated games with complete information (S. Sorin). Repeated games of
incomplete information: Zero-sum (S. Zamir). Repeated games of incomplete
information: Non-zero-sum (F. Forges). Non-cooperative models of bargaining
(K. Binmore, M.J. Osborne and A. Rubinstein). Strategic analysis of
auctions (R. Wilson). Location (J.J. Gabszewicz, J.-F. Thisse). Strategic
models of entry deterrence (R. Wilson). Patent licensing (M.I. Kamien). The
core and balancedness (Y. Kannai). Axiomatizations of the core (B. Peleg).
The core in perfectly competitive economies (R.M. Anderson). The core in
imperfectly competitive economies (J.J. Gabszewicz, B. Shitovitz).
Two-sided matching (A.E. Roth, M. Sotomayor). Von Neumann - Morgenstern
stable sets (W.F. Lucas). The bargaining set, kernel and nucleolus: A
survey (M. Maschler). Game and decision theoretic models in ethics (J.C.
Harsanyi).