Having It Both Ways
Hybrid Theories and Modern Metaethics
Herausgeber: Fletcher, Guy; Ridge, Michael
Having It Both Ways
Hybrid Theories and Modern Metaethics
Herausgeber: Fletcher, Guy; Ridge, Michael
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In twelve new essays, contributors explore hybrid theories in metaethics and other normative domains.
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In twelve new essays, contributors explore hybrid theories in metaethics and other normative domains.
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Oxford University Press, USA
- Seitenzahl: 320
- Erscheinungstermin: 25. November 2014
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 236mm x 155mm x 30mm
- Gewicht: 567g
- ISBN-13: 9780199347582
- ISBN-10: 0199347581
- Artikelnr.: 47870234
- Verlag: Oxford University Press, USA
- Seitenzahl: 320
- Erscheinungstermin: 25. November 2014
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 236mm x 155mm x 30mm
- Gewicht: 567g
- ISBN-13: 9780199347582
- ISBN-10: 0199347581
- Artikelnr.: 47870234
Guy Fletcher is British Academy Postdoctoral Fellow and Lecturer at the University of Edinburgh. Michael Ridge is Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh.
* Contributors
* Introduction
* Part I
* 1. How to Insult a Philosopher
* Michael Ridge
* 2. Expressivism, Non-Declaratives, and Success-Conditional Semantics
* Daniel Boisvert
* 3. Can a Hybrid Theory Have it Both Ways? Moral Thought, Open
Questions and Moral Motivation
* David Copp
* 4. Attitudinal Requirements for Moral Thought and Language:
Noncognitive Type-Generality
* Ryan Hay
* 5. Diachronic Hybrid Moral Realism
* Jon Tresan
* 6. The Pragmatics of Normative Disagreement
* Stephen Finlay
* 7. Hybrid Expressivism: How to Think About Meaning.
* John Eriksson
* Part II
* 8. Moral Utterances, Attitude Expression and Implicature
* Guy Fletcher
* 9. Pure versus Hybrid Expressivism and the Enigma of Conventional
Implicature
* Stephen Barker
* 10. (How) is Ethical Neo- Expressivism a Hybrid View?
* Dorit Bar-On, Matthew Chrisman and Jim Sias
* 11. Why Go Hybrid? A Cognitivist Alternative to Hybrid Theories of
Normative Judgment
* Laura Schroeter and Francois Schroeter
* 12. Truth In Hybrid Semantics
* Mark Schroeder
* Bibliography
* Index
* Introduction
* Part I
* 1. How to Insult a Philosopher
* Michael Ridge
* 2. Expressivism, Non-Declaratives, and Success-Conditional Semantics
* Daniel Boisvert
* 3. Can a Hybrid Theory Have it Both Ways? Moral Thought, Open
Questions and Moral Motivation
* David Copp
* 4. Attitudinal Requirements for Moral Thought and Language:
Noncognitive Type-Generality
* Ryan Hay
* 5. Diachronic Hybrid Moral Realism
* Jon Tresan
* 6. The Pragmatics of Normative Disagreement
* Stephen Finlay
* 7. Hybrid Expressivism: How to Think About Meaning.
* John Eriksson
* Part II
* 8. Moral Utterances, Attitude Expression and Implicature
* Guy Fletcher
* 9. Pure versus Hybrid Expressivism and the Enigma of Conventional
Implicature
* Stephen Barker
* 10. (How) is Ethical Neo- Expressivism a Hybrid View?
* Dorit Bar-On, Matthew Chrisman and Jim Sias
* 11. Why Go Hybrid? A Cognitivist Alternative to Hybrid Theories of
Normative Judgment
* Laura Schroeter and Francois Schroeter
* 12. Truth In Hybrid Semantics
* Mark Schroeder
* Bibliography
* Index
* Contributors
* Introduction
* Part I
* 1. How to Insult a Philosopher
* Michael Ridge
* 2. Expressivism, Non-Declaratives, and Success-Conditional Semantics
* Daniel Boisvert
* 3. Can a Hybrid Theory Have it Both Ways? Moral Thought, Open
Questions and Moral Motivation
* David Copp
* 4. Attitudinal Requirements for Moral Thought and Language:
Noncognitive Type-Generality
* Ryan Hay
* 5. Diachronic Hybrid Moral Realism
* Jon Tresan
* 6. The Pragmatics of Normative Disagreement
* Stephen Finlay
* 7. Hybrid Expressivism: How to Think About Meaning.
* John Eriksson
* Part II
* 8. Moral Utterances, Attitude Expression and Implicature
* Guy Fletcher
* 9. Pure versus Hybrid Expressivism and the Enigma of Conventional
Implicature
* Stephen Barker
* 10. (How) is Ethical Neo- Expressivism a Hybrid View?
* Dorit Bar-On, Matthew Chrisman and Jim Sias
* 11. Why Go Hybrid? A Cognitivist Alternative to Hybrid Theories of
Normative Judgment
* Laura Schroeter and Francois Schroeter
* 12. Truth In Hybrid Semantics
* Mark Schroeder
* Bibliography
* Index
* Introduction
* Part I
* 1. How to Insult a Philosopher
* Michael Ridge
* 2. Expressivism, Non-Declaratives, and Success-Conditional Semantics
* Daniel Boisvert
* 3. Can a Hybrid Theory Have it Both Ways? Moral Thought, Open
Questions and Moral Motivation
* David Copp
* 4. Attitudinal Requirements for Moral Thought and Language:
Noncognitive Type-Generality
* Ryan Hay
* 5. Diachronic Hybrid Moral Realism
* Jon Tresan
* 6. The Pragmatics of Normative Disagreement
* Stephen Finlay
* 7. Hybrid Expressivism: How to Think About Meaning.
* John Eriksson
* Part II
* 8. Moral Utterances, Attitude Expression and Implicature
* Guy Fletcher
* 9. Pure versus Hybrid Expressivism and the Enigma of Conventional
Implicature
* Stephen Barker
* 10. (How) is Ethical Neo- Expressivism a Hybrid View?
* Dorit Bar-On, Matthew Chrisman and Jim Sias
* 11. Why Go Hybrid? A Cognitivist Alternative to Hybrid Theories of
Normative Judgment
* Laura Schroeter and Francois Schroeter
* 12. Truth In Hybrid Semantics
* Mark Schroeder
* Bibliography
* Index