Thomas Gilovich / Dale Griffin / Daniel Kahneman (eds.)

Heuristics and Biases

The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
Herausgegeben:Kahneman, Daniel; Griffin, Dale; Gilovich, Thomas

• Broschiertes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

Judgment pervades human experience. When do people make judgments that serve them well, and why are they accurate in these situations? When are people's judgments prone to bias, and what is responsible for their biases? This book, first published in 2002, compiles psychologists' best attempts to answer these important questions.

Produktdetails

• Verlag: Cambridge University Press
• Seitenzahl: 882
• Erscheinungstermin: 10. September 2013
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 234mm x 156mm x 47mm
• Gewicht: 1300g
• ISBN-13: 9780521796798
• ISBN-10: 0521796792
• Artikelnr.: 14956757

Autorenporträt

Daniel Kahneman, geboren 1934 in Tel-Aviv, ist einer der weltweit einflussreichsten Kognitionspsychologen. Nach Stationen an der Hebrew University in Jerusalem und der University of British Columbia war er bis 1994 Professor an der University of California in Berkeley und hält seither die Eugene-Higgins-Professur für Psychologie an der Woodrow Wilson School der Princeton University. Kahnemann revolutionierte die Wissenschaft vom menschlichen Verhalten, indem er die Erkenntnisse der Hirnforschung und der Verhaltensbiologie zusammenführt und auf die Wirtschaftswissenschaften anwendet. Für seine Arbeit erhielt Kahneman zahlreiche Ehrenpreise namhafter Universitäten und wurde 2002 als erster Nicht-Ökonom mit dem Wirtschaftsnobelpreis ausgezeichnet.

Inhaltsangabe

Introduction: heuristics and biases then and now; Part I. Theoretical and Empirical Extensions: 1. Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: the conjunction fallacy in probability judgment; 2. Representativeness revisited: attribute substitution in intuitive judgment; 3. How alike is it versus how likely it is: a disjunction fallacy in probability judgments; 4. Imagining can heighten or lower the perceived likelihood of contracting a disease: the mediating effect of ease of imagery; 5. The availability heuristic revisited: ease of recall and content of recall as distinct sources of information; 6. Incorporating the irrelevant: anchors in judgments of belief and value; 7. Putting adjustment back in the anchoring and adjustment heuristic: differential processing of self-generate and experimenter-provided anchors; 8. Self anchoring in conversation: why language users don't do what they 'should'; 9. Inferential correction; 10. Mental contamination and the debiasing problem; 11. Sympathetic magical thinking: the contagion and similarity 'heuristics'; 12. Compatibility effects in judgment and choice; 13. The weighing of evidence and the determinants of confidence; 14. Inside the planning fallacy: the causes and consequences of optimistic time predictions; 15. Probability judgment across cultures; 16. Durability bias in affective forecasting; 17. Resistance of personal risk perceptions to debiasing interventions; 18. Ambiguity and self-evaluation: the role of idiosyncratic trait definitions in self-serving assessments of ability; 19. When predictions fail: the dilemma of unrealistic optimism; 20. Norm theory: comparing reality to its alternatives; 21. Counterfactual thought, regret, and superstition: how to avoid kicking yourself; Part II. New Theoretical Directions: 22. Two systems of reasoning; 23. The affect heuristic; 24. Individual differences in reasoning: implications for the rationality debate?; 25. Support theory: a nonextensional representation of subjective probability; 26. Unpacking, repacking, and anchoring: advances in support theory; 27. Remarks on support theory: recent advances and future directions; 28. The use of statistical heuristics in everyday inductive reasoning; 29. Feelings as information: moods influence judgments and processing strategies; 30. Automated choice heuristics; 31. How good are fast and frugal heuristics?; 32. Intuitive politicians, theologians, and prosecutors: exploring the empirical implications of deviant functionalist metaphors; Part III. Real World Applications: 33. The hot hand in basketball: on the misperception of random sequences; 34. Like goes with like: the role of representativeness in erroneous and pseudoscientific beliefs; 35. When less is more: counterfactual thinking and satisfaction among Olympic medalists; 36. Understanding misunderstanding: social psychological perspectives; 37. Assessing uncertainty in physical constants; 38. Do analysts overreact?; 39. The calibration of expert judgment: Heuristics and biases beyond the laboratory; 40. Clinical versus actuarial judgment; 41. Heuristics and biases in application; 42. Theory driven reasoning about plausible pasts and probable futures in world politics.

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Introduction: heuristics and biases then and now; Part I. Theoretical and
Empirical Extensions: 1. Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: the
conjunction fallacy in probability judgment; 2. Representativeness
revisited: attribute substitution in intuitive judgment; 3. How alike is it
versus how likely it is: a disjunction fallacy in probability judgments; 4.
Imagining can heighten or lower the perceived likelihood of contracting a
disease: the mediating effect of ease of imagery; 5. The availability
heuristic revisited: ease of recall and content of recall as distinct
sources of information; 6. Incorporating the irrelevant: anchors in
judgments of belief and value; 7. Putting adjustment back in the anchoring
and adjustment heuristic: differential processing of self-generate and
experimenter-provided anchors; 8. Self anchoring in conversation: why
language users don't do what they 'should'; 9. Inferential correction; 10.
Mental contamination and the debiasing problem; 11. Sympathetic magical
thinking: the contagion and similarity 'heuristics'; 12. Compatibility
effects in judgment and choice; 13. The weighing of evidence and the
determinants of confidence; 14. Inside the planning fallacy: the causes and
consequences of optimistic time predictions; 15. Probability judgment
across cultures; 16. Durability bias in affective forecasting; 17.
Resistance of personal risk perceptions to debiasing interventions; 18.
Ambiguity and self-evaluation: the role of idiosyncratic trait definitions
in self-serving assessments of ability; 19. When predictions fail: the
dilemma of unrealistic optimism; 20. Norm theory: comparing reality to its
alternatives; 21. Counterfactual thought, regret, and superstition: how to
avoid kicking yourself; Part II. New Theoretical Directions: 22. Two
systems of reasoning; 23. The affect heuristic; 24. Individual differences
in reasoning: implications for the rationality debate?; 25. Support theory:
a nonextensional representation of subjective probability; 26. Unpacking,
repacking, and anchoring: advances in support theory; 27. Remarks on
support theory: recent advances and future directions; 28. The use of
statistical heuristics in everyday inductive reasoning; 29. Feelings as
information: moods influence judgments and processing strategies; 30.
Automated choice heuristics; 31. How good are fast and frugal heuristics?;
32. Intuitive politicians, theologians, and prosecutors: exploring the
empirical implications of deviant functionalist metaphors; Part III. Real
World Applications: 33. The hot hand in basketball: on the misperception of
random sequences; 34. Like goes with like: the role of representativeness
in erroneous and pseudoscientific beliefs; 35. When less is more:
counterfactual thinking and satisfaction among Olympic medalists; 36.
Understanding misunderstanding: social psychological perspectives; 37.
Assessing uncertainty in physical constants; 38. Do analysts overreact?;
39. The calibration of expert judgment: Heuristics and biases beyond the
laboratory; 40. Clinical versus actuarial judgment; 41. Heuristics and
biases in application; 42. Theory driven reasoning about plausible pasts
and probable futures in world politics.

Rezensionen

Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment; offers a massive, state-of-the-art treatment of the literature, supplementing a similar book published two decades ago...This is an impressive book, full of implications for law and policy." Cass Sunstein, University of Chicago Law School