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We often have reason to doubt our own ability to form rational beliefs, particularly when we are exposed to higher-order evidence. This book explains how disagreements with trusted friends, or learning of our own cognitive biases, can impact on our views. From there it explores a range of interrelated issues on this topic of higher-order evidence.

Produktbeschreibung
We often have reason to doubt our own ability to form rational beliefs, particularly when we are exposed to higher-order evidence. This book explains how disagreements with trusted friends, or learning of our own cognitive biases, can impact on our views. From there it explores a range of interrelated issues on this topic of higher-order evidence.
Autorenporträt
Mattias Skipper is a PhD Candidate in Philosophy at Aarhus University. He works mainly in epistemology, including formal and social epistemology, but also has interests in philosophical logic, philosophy of language and philosophy of science. His dissertation project aims to shed light on a number of issues concerning the normative role of higher-order evidence. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen is Professor of Philosophy at Aarhus University. He has published widely in epistemology, philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and philosophy of language, with a major strand of work devoted to epistemic normativity and the nature of belief. He is the co-editor of Reasons for Belief (Cambridge 2011).