Main description:
Higher-Order (HO) theories of consciousness have in common the idea that what makes a mental state conscious is that it is the object of some kind of higher-order representation. This volume presents fourteen previously unpublished essays both defending and criticizing this approach to the problem of consciousness. It is the first anthology devoted entirely to HO theories of consciousness. There are several kinds of HO theory, such as the HOT (higher-order thought) and HOP (higher-order perception) models, and each is discussed and debated. Part One contains essays by authors who defend some form of HO theory. Part Two includes papers by those who are critics of the HO approach. Some of the topics covered include animal consciousness, misrepresentation, the nature of pain, subvocal speech, subliminal perception, blindsight, the nature of emotion, the difference between perception and thought, first-order versus higher-order theories of consciousness, and the relationship between nonconscious and conscious mentality. (Series A)
Table of contents:
- Contributors
- 1. Higher-order theories of consciousness
- Part I: Defenders of higher-order theories
- 2. Varieties of higher-order theory
- 3. Higher-order thoughts, animal consciousness, and misrepresentation
- 4. Higher-order global states (HOGS)
- 5. The superiority of HOP to HOT
- 6. HOP over FOR, HOT theory
- 7. A higher order syntactic thought (HOST) theory of consciousness
- 8. Assumptions of a subjective measure of consciousness
- Part II: Critics of the higher-order approach
- 9. What phenomenal consciousness is like
- 10. Either FOR or HOR
- 11. A cold look at HOT theory
- 12. HOT theories of consciousness
- 13. A few thoughts too many?
- 14. Higher order representation in a mentalistic metatheory
- 15. Ouch! An essay on pain
- Index of names
- Index of topics
Higher-Order (HO) theories of consciousness have in common the idea that what makes a mental state conscious is that it is the object of some kind of higher-order representation. This volume presents fourteen previously unpublished essays both defending and criticizing this approach to the problem of consciousness. It is the first anthology devoted entirely to HO theories of consciousness. There are several kinds of HO theory, such as the HOT (higher-order thought) and HOP (higher-order perception) models, and each is discussed and debated. Part One contains essays by authors who defend some form of HO theory. Part Two includes papers by those who are critics of the HO approach. Some of the topics covered include animal consciousness, misrepresentation, the nature of pain, subvocal speech, subliminal perception, blindsight, the nature of emotion, the difference between perception and thought, first-order versus higher-order theories of consciousness, and the relationship between nonconscious and conscious mentality. (Series A)
Table of contents:
- Contributors
- 1. Higher-order theories of consciousness
- Part I: Defenders of higher-order theories
- 2. Varieties of higher-order theory
- 3. Higher-order thoughts, animal consciousness, and misrepresentation
- 4. Higher-order global states (HOGS)
- 5. The superiority of HOP to HOT
- 6. HOP over FOR, HOT theory
- 7. A higher order syntactic thought (HOST) theory of consciousness
- 8. Assumptions of a subjective measure of consciousness
- Part II: Critics of the higher-order approach
- 9. What phenomenal consciousness is like
- 10. Either FOR or HOR
- 11. A cold look at HOT theory
- 12. HOT theories of consciousness
- 13. A few thoughts too many?
- 14. Higher order representation in a mentalistic metatheory
- 15. Ouch! An essay on pain
- Index of names
- Index of topics