Hiring and Firing Public Officials - Buchler, Justin
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Conventional theories of elections hold that an election is analogous to a consumer product market. This analogy underlies decades of electoral theory, but in Hiring and Firing Public Officials, Justin Buchler contends that it does not capture the real nature of elections. As Buchler shows, an election is a mechanism by which voters hire and fire public officials. Thus, the health of democracy depends not on regular competitive elections, but on posing a credible threat to fire public officials who do not perform their jobs well. However, the purpose of that threat is to force public officials…mehr

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Produktbeschreibung
Conventional theories of elections hold that an election is analogous to a consumer product market. This analogy underlies decades of electoral theory, but in Hiring and Firing Public Officials, Justin Buchler contends that it does not capture the real nature of elections. As Buchler shows, an election is a mechanism by which voters hire and fire public officials. Thus, the health of democracy depends not on regular competitive elections, but on posing a credible threat to fire public officials who do not perform their jobs well. However, the purpose of that threat is to force public officials to act as faithful public servants so that they do not have to be fired. Thus, competitive elections, by most definitions, are indicative of a failure of the democratic system.
Autorenporträt
Justin Buchler is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Case Western Reserve University. He is the author of several articles about the negative consequences of competitive elections, including, "The Social Sub-optimality of Competitive Elections," which won the 2007 Gordon Tullock Award for Best Paper By A Young Scholar.