Several scholarly discussions have been held and numerous studies conducted on the subject of counterinsurgency warfare but only a little emphasis has been made on studying the relationship between negotiations and the growth of insurgents. For that reason, an effort was made to research this unexamined area, initially by conducting an in-depth review on the literature published on the subjects of insurgency and negotiations to acquire a sound knowledge on the theoretical foundations pertaining to the key areas of the research question and subsequently by analyzing a case study on the Sri Lankan scenario, where a prolonged counterinsurgency campaign has been waged for the last two decades. This research focuses on four different episodes where the Government of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (GOSL) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) had conducted negotiations from 1985 to 2003 in order to analyze how an insurgent organization makes use of negotiations for its growth and survival through a case studies methodology. The study concludes by logically assessing how the LTTE, as a separatist insurgent organization, has been able to make use of the aforesaid negotiations for its growth and survival. The conclusion also meets the broad purpose of the research by making recommendations for legitimate counterinsurgents to gainfully engage in negotiations while denying the insurgents from gaining advantages during negotiations.
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