This book explains the feedback loop that generates ever-increasing polarization--the signature feature of contemporary American politics. This loop is powered by the discipline exerted by the respective political parties and their activists on both their Congressional members and their district candidates. The authors show that tight party discipline produces party delegations in Congress that are widely separated from one another but each ideologically concentrated--in a word, polarized.
This book explains the feedback loop that generates ever-increasing polarization--the signature feature of contemporary American politics. This loop is powered by the discipline exerted by the respective political parties and their activists on both their Congressional members and their district candidates. The authors show that tight party discipline produces party delegations in Congress that are widely separated from one another but each ideologically concentrated--in a word, polarized.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Samuel Merrill III has served as a professor of mathematics at the University of Rochester and Wilkes University. He received a PhD in Mathematics from Yale University and an MS in Statistics from Pennsylvania State University. Bernard Grofman is Distinguished Research Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Irvine and the inaugural Jack W. Peltason Chair of Democracy Studies at the University of California, Irvine. Thomas L. Brunell is Professor of Political Science University of Texas at Dallas
Inhaltsangabe
* Acknowledgements * Part I: Where Did Polarization Come From and Why is it Getting Worse? * Chapter 1. Making Sense of Polarization * Chapter 2. How Does Party Discipline Generate Polarization? * Chapter 3. Why, Even in Highly Competitive Districts, Are Candidate Positions so Different? * Chapter 4. Heterogeneity across Districts and Within-district Partisan Gap and Proclivity * Part II: Conseqences of Polarization * Chapter 5. How Do Party Loyalty and Activist Influence Foster Mobilizing the Base? * Chapter 6. Consequences of Polarized Politics * Chapter 7. Discussion and Conclusions * Appendices * Appendix to Chapter 1: Literature Review on Causes of Polarization * Appendix to Chapter 2: The Party-constraint Model * Appendix to Chapter 3: Relation between Candidate and District Ideology: Statistical and Theoretical Analyses * Appendix to Chapter 4: Components of Legislative Polarization * Appendix to Chapter 5: Derivations for the Appeal-to-the-Base Model * Appendix to Chapter 6: Derivations relating to Chamber and Party Medians * Bibliography
* Acknowledgements * Part I: Where Did Polarization Come From and Why is it Getting Worse? * Chapter 1. Making Sense of Polarization * Chapter 2. How Does Party Discipline Generate Polarization? * Chapter 3. Why, Even in Highly Competitive Districts, Are Candidate Positions so Different? * Chapter 4. Heterogeneity across Districts and Within-district Partisan Gap and Proclivity * Part II: Conseqences of Polarization * Chapter 5. How Do Party Loyalty and Activist Influence Foster Mobilizing the Base? * Chapter 6. Consequences of Polarized Politics * Chapter 7. Discussion and Conclusions * Appendices * Appendix to Chapter 1: Literature Review on Causes of Polarization * Appendix to Chapter 2: The Party-constraint Model * Appendix to Chapter 3: Relation between Candidate and District Ideology: Statistical and Theoretical Analyses * Appendix to Chapter 4: Components of Legislative Polarization * Appendix to Chapter 5: Derivations for the Appeal-to-the-Base Model * Appendix to Chapter 6: Derivations relating to Chamber and Party Medians * Bibliography
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