Luke Garrod, Jr., Joseph E. Harrington,
Hub-and-Spoke Cartels
Why They Form, How They Operate, and How to Prosecute Them
Luke Garrod, Jr., Joseph E. Harrington,
Hub-and-Spoke Cartels
Why They Form, How They Operate, and How to Prosecute Them
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"A comprehensive economic and legal analysis of a unique form of collusive behavior"--
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"A comprehensive economic and legal analysis of a unique form of collusive behavior"--
Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: MIT Press Ltd
- Seitenzahl: 264
- Erscheinungstermin: 16. November 2021
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 152mm x 229mm x 22mm
- Gewicht: 430g
- ISBN-13: 9780262046206
- ISBN-10: 0262046202
- Artikelnr.: 62303930
- Verlag: MIT Press Ltd
- Seitenzahl: 264
- Erscheinungstermin: 16. November 2021
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 152mm x 229mm x 22mm
- Gewicht: 430g
- ISBN-13: 9780262046206
- ISBN-10: 0262046202
- Artikelnr.: 62303930
Luke Garrod is Senior Lecturer in Economics at the School of Business and Economics at Loughborough University in the UK. Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., is Patrick T. Harker Professor at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania and author of The Theory of Collusion and Competition Policy (MIT Press) and other books. Matthew Olczak is a Senior Lecturer in Economics at Aston University in the UK.
Preface
1: Introduction
1.1: What Is a Hub-and-Spoke Cartel?
1.2: Why Study Hub-and-Spoke Cartels?
1.3: Approach and Overview
2: General Analysis of Hub-and-Spoke Collusion
2.1: Collusion Requires Participation, Stability, and Coordination
2.2: Participation, Stability, and Coordination Conditions for a
Hub-and-Spoke Cartel
2.3: Summary and Final Remarks
3: Collusion to Raise Downstream Prices: Upstream Supplier as Hub
3.1: Economic Framework
3.2: Cases
3.3: General Lessons
3.4: Appendix: Sugar (Canada)
3.5: Technical Appendix
4: Collusion to Raise Downstream Prices: Downstream Intermediary as Hub
4.1: Economic Framework
4.2: Cases
4.3: General Lessons
5: Collusion to Exclude Rival Firms
5.1: Economic Framework
5.2: Cases
5.3: General Lessons
5.4: Appendix: Automobile Retailing—General Motors (US)
5.5: Technical Appendix
6: General Assessment of Hub-and-Spoke Cartels
6.1: Cartel Formation
6.2: Cartel Operations
6.3: Cartel Efficiency
7: Competition Law and Hub-and-Spoke Collusion
Notes
References
Index
1: Introduction
1.1: What Is a Hub-and-Spoke Cartel?
1.2: Why Study Hub-and-Spoke Cartels?
1.3: Approach and Overview
2: General Analysis of Hub-and-Spoke Collusion
2.1: Collusion Requires Participation, Stability, and Coordination
2.2: Participation, Stability, and Coordination Conditions for a
Hub-and-Spoke Cartel
2.3: Summary and Final Remarks
3: Collusion to Raise Downstream Prices: Upstream Supplier as Hub
3.1: Economic Framework
3.2: Cases
3.3: General Lessons
3.4: Appendix: Sugar (Canada)
3.5: Technical Appendix
4: Collusion to Raise Downstream Prices: Downstream Intermediary as Hub
4.1: Economic Framework
4.2: Cases
4.3: General Lessons
5: Collusion to Exclude Rival Firms
5.1: Economic Framework
5.2: Cases
5.3: General Lessons
5.4: Appendix: Automobile Retailing—General Motors (US)
5.5: Technical Appendix
6: General Assessment of Hub-and-Spoke Cartels
6.1: Cartel Formation
6.2: Cartel Operations
6.3: Cartel Efficiency
7: Competition Law and Hub-and-Spoke Collusion
Notes
References
Index
Preface
1: Introduction
1.1: What Is a Hub-and-Spoke Cartel?
1.2: Why Study Hub-and-Spoke Cartels?
1.3: Approach and Overview
2: General Analysis of Hub-and-Spoke Collusion
2.1: Collusion Requires Participation, Stability, and Coordination
2.2: Participation, Stability, and Coordination Conditions for a
Hub-and-Spoke Cartel
2.3: Summary and Final Remarks
3: Collusion to Raise Downstream Prices: Upstream Supplier as Hub
3.1: Economic Framework
3.2: Cases
3.3: General Lessons
3.4: Appendix: Sugar (Canada)
3.5: Technical Appendix
4: Collusion to Raise Downstream Prices: Downstream Intermediary as Hub
4.1: Economic Framework
4.2: Cases
4.3: General Lessons
5: Collusion to Exclude Rival Firms
5.1: Economic Framework
5.2: Cases
5.3: General Lessons
5.4: Appendix: Automobile Retailing—General Motors (US)
5.5: Technical Appendix
6: General Assessment of Hub-and-Spoke Cartels
6.1: Cartel Formation
6.2: Cartel Operations
6.3: Cartel Efficiency
7: Competition Law and Hub-and-Spoke Collusion
Notes
References
Index
1: Introduction
1.1: What Is a Hub-and-Spoke Cartel?
1.2: Why Study Hub-and-Spoke Cartels?
1.3: Approach and Overview
2: General Analysis of Hub-and-Spoke Collusion
2.1: Collusion Requires Participation, Stability, and Coordination
2.2: Participation, Stability, and Coordination Conditions for a
Hub-and-Spoke Cartel
2.3: Summary and Final Remarks
3: Collusion to Raise Downstream Prices: Upstream Supplier as Hub
3.1: Economic Framework
3.2: Cases
3.3: General Lessons
3.4: Appendix: Sugar (Canada)
3.5: Technical Appendix
4: Collusion to Raise Downstream Prices: Downstream Intermediary as Hub
4.1: Economic Framework
4.2: Cases
4.3: General Lessons
5: Collusion to Exclude Rival Firms
5.1: Economic Framework
5.2: Cases
5.3: General Lessons
5.4: Appendix: Automobile Retailing—General Motors (US)
5.5: Technical Appendix
6: General Assessment of Hub-and-Spoke Cartels
6.1: Cartel Formation
6.2: Cartel Operations
6.3: Cartel Efficiency
7: Competition Law and Hub-and-Spoke Collusion
Notes
References
Index