This book evaluates different conceptions of human dignity with a view to articulate a more plausible and attractive account that allows for the recognition of the dignity of severely mentally disabled people. Many of the existing conceptions of human dignity inevitably exclude the severely mentally disabled. Attention is given to the dominant Kantian conception of dignity as well as to sub-Saharan African notions. This book articulates and critically defends the most attractive and plausible aspects of sub-Saharan African thought that can contribute to the development of an attractive and plausible account of human dignity that will recognize the dignity of severely mentally disabled people. In order to fulfill this aim, I address the following question: What would a plausible and attractive account of human dignity that is able to recognize the dignity of severely mentally disabled people look like? This book argues that the theoretical resources for a more inclusive and attractive conception of human dignity can be found in sub-Saharan thought, and that can also contribute to the growing realization that African philosophy has a valuable contribution.