Neil Sinhababu defends the Humean Theory of Motivation, according to which desire drives all human action and practical reasoning. This theory helps us to understand core aspects of human nature, such as intention, the will, moral belief, emotion, and the self; and it has revolutionary consequences for ethics.
Neil Sinhababu defends the Humean Theory of Motivation, according to which desire drives all human action and practical reasoning. This theory helps us to understand core aspects of human nature, such as intention, the will, moral belief, emotion, and the self; and it has revolutionary consequences for ethics.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Neil Sinhababu is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the National University of Singapore. His previous work defending the Humean Theory of Motivation has appeared in Philosophical Review and Noûs. He has also published on philosophy of mind, ethics, epistemology, Nietzsche, and how to have romantic relationships with people in other possible worlds. He received his Ph.D from the University of Texas at Austin and his B.A. from Harvard University.
Inhaltsangabe
1: The return of the Humean Theory 2: Properties of desire 3: Desire and pleasure 4: Moral judgment 5: Desire and attention 6: Intention 7: Desire and vividness 8: Willpower 9: Reasons 10: Agency and the self 11: Metaethics for Humean beings
1: The return of the Humean Theory 2: Properties of desire 3: Desire and pleasure 4: Moral judgment 5: Desire and attention 6: Intention 7: Desire and vividness 8: Willpower 9: Reasons 10: Agency and the self 11: Metaethics for Humean beings
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