Incentives and Political Economy - Laffont, Jean-Jacques
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The final part of the book reconsiders the modeling of collusion given asymmetric information. It proposes a new approach to characterizing incentives constraints for group behaviour when asymmetric information is non-verifiable. This provides a methodology to characterize the optimal constitutional response to activities of interest groups and to study the design of any institutions in which group behavior is important.
Laffont examines the incentive problems created by delegating economic policy to self-interested politicians and the blurry line between flexibility of decision-making and discretion to pursue personal agendas. _…mehr

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Produktbeschreibung
The final part of the book reconsiders the modeling of collusion given asymmetric information. It proposes a new approach to characterizing incentives constraints for group behaviour when asymmetric information is non-verifiable. This provides a methodology to characterize the optimal constitutional response to activities of interest groups and to study the design of any institutions in which group behavior is important.
Laffont examines the incentive problems created by delegating economic policy to self-interested politicians and the blurry line between flexibility of decision-making and discretion to pursue personal agendas. _
Autorenporträt
Jean-Jacques Laffont is Professor of Economics at the University of Toulouse and director of the Institut d'Economie Industrielle (IDEI). His recent research focuses on regulation, political economy, and development. Winner of the Yrjö Jahnsson award in 1993, he was President of the Econometric Society in 1992 and President of the European Economic Association in 1998.