Nathan M. Jensen, Edmund Malesky

Incentives to Pander

• Gebundenes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

An examination of why politicians choose to employ targeted tax incentives to firms that are inefficient and distortionary.

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Produktdetails

• Verlag: Cambridge University Press
• Seitenzahl: 272
• Erscheinungstermin: 24. Mai 2018
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 235mm x 157mm x 19mm
• Gewicht: 549g
• ISBN-13: 9781108418904
• ISBN-10: 1108418902
• Artikelnr.: 49664256

Autorenporträt

Nathan M. Jensen is Professor of Government at the University of Texas, Austin. His research focusses on government economic development strategies, firm non-market strategies and business-government relations, as well as the politics of oil and natural resources, political risk in emerging markets, trade policy, and international institutions.

Inhaltsangabe

1. Introduction: the global competition for capital meets local politics
2. A theory of the political use of investment incentives
3. Incentives and the competition for investment within countries and around the world
4. The economic case against investment incentives
5. Economic or political competition? Allocation and oversight of US incentives
6. Money for money: campaign contributions in exchange for financial incentives?
7. Political pandering in the United States: a survey experiment on incentives and investment
8. Pandering upward: tax incentives and credit claiming in authoritarian countries
9. The distributional effects of investment incentives
10. Potential policy solutions to the pandering problem
11. Final thoughts.