This book examines incentives at work to see how and how well coordination is achieved by motivating individual decision makers.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Donald E. Campbell is the CSX Professor of Economics at the College of William and Mary, Virginia. Campbell received a B.A. from Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario and his doctorate from Princeton University, New Jersey, and previously taught at the University of Toronto for twenty years. He specializes in mechanism design and social choice theory and teaches advanced courses on incentives and information. He has written three books and over 100 articles in leading journals.
Inhaltsangabe
1. Equilibrium, efficiency, and asymmetric information 2. Basic models and tools 3. Hidden action 4. Corporate governance 5. Hidden characteristics 6. Auctions 7. Voting and preference revelation 8. Public goods and preference revelation 9. Matching 10. Networks 11. General competitive equilibrium.
