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It is essential for anyone involved in law, politics, and government, as well as students of the governmental process, to comprehend the workings of the federal independent regulatory agencies of the United States. Occasionally referred to as the "headless fourth branch of government," these agencies do not fit neatly within any of the three constitutional branches. Their members are appointed for terms that typically exceed those of the President, and they cannot be removed from office in the absence of some sort of malfeasance or misconduct. They wield enormous power over the private sector,…mehr

Produktbeschreibung
It is essential for anyone involved in law, politics, and government, as well as students of the governmental process, to comprehend the workings of the federal independent regulatory agencies of the United States. Occasionally referred to as the "headless fourth branch of government," these agencies do not fit neatly within any of the three constitutional branches. Their members are appointed for terms that typically exceed those of the President, and they cannot be removed from office in the absence of some sort of malfeasance or misconduct. They wield enormous power over the private sector, and they have foreign analogues. In Independent Agencies in the United States, Marshall Breger and Gary Edles provide a full-length study of the structure and workings of federal independent regulatory agencies in the US. This book focuses on traditional multi-member agencies that have a significant impact on the American economy, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, the National Labor Relations Commission, and the Federal Trade Commission. This work recognizes that the changing kaleidoscope of modern life has led Congress to create idiosyncratic administrative structures consisting of independent agencies squarely within the Executive Branch, including government corporations and government-sponsored enterprises, to establish a new construct of independence to meet the changing needs of the administrative state. In the process, Breger and Edles analyze the general conflict between political accountability and agency independence. This book also compares US with EU and certain UK independent agencies to offer a unique comparative perspective. Included is a first-of-its-kind appendix describing the powers and procedures of the more than 35 independent US federal agencies, with each supplemented by a selective bibliography of pertinent materials.
Autorenporträt
Marshall J. Breger is a Professor of Law at the Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of America. He was a Senior Fellow at the Heritage Foundation specializing in labor, regulatory and trade policy (including NAFTA). During the George H.W. Bush Administration, he served as Solicitor of Labor, the chief lawyer of the Labor Department, and Chair of the Tripartite Advisory Panel on International Labor Standards (TAPILS). During 1992, by Presidential designation, he served concurrently as Acting Assistant Secretary for Labor Management Standards. He was Chairman of the Administrative Conference of the United States, an independent federal agency charged with developing improvements in the administrative process. Professor Breger is a contributing columnist to Moment magazine. Gary J. Edles is a Fellow in Administrative Law and Adjunct Professor of Law at American University, Washington College of Law, where he teaches a course on the Federal Regulatory Process. He is also Visiting Professor at the University of Hull Law School, where he teaches American Public Law, and lectures on comparative British-American public law. He is licensed as a lawyer in the United States, and is a member of Gray's Inn (UK).