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Information exchanges between competitors are commonplace and often beneficial for a successful functioning of the markets. The policy of the competition authorities within the EU has, however, at times equated instances of information exchanges with those of hard-core cartels. This paper explores whether the standard that has been used for concluding that an information exchange scheme is restrictive of competition by object is workable in terms of law and economics and appropriate given the special nature of the information exchanges distinguishing them from the hard-core infringements.

Produktbeschreibung
Information exchanges between competitors are commonplace and often beneficial for a successful functioning of the markets. The policy of the competition authorities within the EU has, however, at times equated instances of information exchanges with those of hard-core cartels. This paper explores whether the standard that has been used for concluding that an information exchange scheme is restrictive of competition by object is workable in terms of law and economics and appropriate given the special nature of the information exchanges distinguishing them from the hard-core infringements.
Autorenporträt
Dina works for the Lithuanian Competition Council and is now an International Fellow at the US Federal Trade Commission. Dina obtained her LLM in Competition Law from King's College London and her law degree from Vilnius University (Lithuania). Dina has previously worked at DG COMP and with an EU & Competition law team of the Baltic law firm LAWIN.