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This book challenges the common view that the World Bank can be seen as a single player in world politics. Its critics credit it with common views and an over-riding neo-liberal philosophy, which it imposes on unwilling countries. We argue that the Bank, far from being a unitary actor, is fundamentally plural, internally fragmented and dispersed, with cascading chains of delegation, authority and controls, and with considerable discretion delegated to the staff. There are management dilemmas that ensure internal variations of opinion and approach are an inevitable part of its activities. Bank…mehr

Produktbeschreibung
This book challenges the common view that the World Bank can be seen as a single player in world politics. Its critics credit it with common views and an over-riding neo-liberal philosophy, which it imposes on unwilling countries. We argue that the Bank, far from being a unitary actor, is fundamentally plural, internally fragmented and dispersed, with cascading chains of delegation, authority and controls, and with considerable discretion delegated to the staff. There are management dilemmas that ensure internal variations of opinion and approach are an inevitable part of its activities. Bank staff are important players in shaping the operation of the Bank; they have scope for creativity in the selection of the development programs and projects the Bank undertakes in the client/partner countries. To understand the Bank it is necessary to appreciate how it works and what impact the staff can have.
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Autorenporträt
XU YI-CHONG and PATRICK WELLER are professors of politics at the Centre for Governance and Public Policy at Griffith University, USA.
Rezensionen
"Providing a rich description of many aspects of the World Bank, with details on internal operations that specialists may value, the authors posit that the World Bank is not well described by conventional principal-agent or bureaucratic models. Summing Up: Recommended." - Choice