Joshua Stuchlik defends the principle of double effect, according to which there is a morally significant difference between intentional and incidental harm. In doing so he uncovers mutually beneficial links between ethics, philosophy of action, and moral psychology.
Joshua Stuchlik defends the principle of double effect, according to which there is a morally significant difference between intentional and incidental harm. In doing so he uncovers mutually beneficial links between ethics, philosophy of action, and moral psychology.
Joshua Stuchlik is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of St. Thomas, Minnesota. He works on ethics, the philosophy of action, and epistemology, and has published articles in journals including Philosophical Studies, Synthese, and the Journal of Moral Philosophy.
Inhaltsangabe
Introduction 1. The principle of double effect 2. The grounding challenge 3. Double effect and the morality of solidarity 4. An Anscombian account of intentional action 5. The closeness problem 6. The irrelevance theory and more objections 7. Has cognitive science debunked deontology? Double effect and Greene's debunking argument Conclusion References Index.
Introduction 1. The principle of double effect 2. The grounding challenge 3. Double effect and the morality of solidarity 4. An Anscombian account of intentional action 5. The closeness problem 6. The irrelevance theory and more objections 7. Has cognitive science debunked deontology? Double effect and Greene's debunking argument Conclusion References Index.
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