The recent financial crisis is considered to be the most severe one since the Great Depression in the 1930s since banks had to write down $200 billion in bad loans in November 2007 because of the large losses in the mortgage markets and lost about $8 trillion in 2008. According to an OECD report, the financial crisis can be to an important extent attributed to failures and weaknesses in Corporate Governance arrangements. However, the empirical literature provides evidence that banks with better corporate governance performed worse during the crisis. With regard to these issues following questions might arise: How do regulation and leverage interact with corporate governance? Why does banks governance differ from governance of other firms? How does banks corporate governance influence the risk-taking behavior? How did corporate governance affect banks performance during the financial crisis? Where did the governance of banks fail during the recent financial crisis? What was different in the banking industry before and after the crisis? Does the generous executive pay motivate managers to do their jobs better or is it the result of moral hazard problems?