A theory of international courts that assumes member states can ignore international agreements and adverse rulings, and that the court does not have informational advantages.
A theory of international courts that assumes member states can ignore international agreements and adverse rulings, and that the court does not have informational advantages.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Clifford J. Carrubba is a Professor of Political Science, Chair of the Political Science Department, and Professor of Law, by courtesy, at Emory University, Atlanta. He also founded and is currently serving as the Director of the Institute for Quantitative Theory and Methods at Emory University. Carrubba has published in the American Political Science Review, the American Journal of Political Science, the Journal of Politics, International Organizations, Political Analysis, Legislative Studies Quarterly, Comparative Political Studies, and the Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization.
Inhaltsangabe
1. Introduction: international courts and compliance; 2. A theory of courts and compliance in international law; 3. The empirical relevance of the theoretical model: evaluating the hypotheses in the European Union context; 4. Preliminary considerations on testing the political-sensitivity hypothesis: designing a control for the legal merits; 5. A test of the political-sensitivity hypothesis; 6. A test of the conditional-effectiveness hypothesis: the European Court of Justice and economic integration; 7. Conclusion.
1. Introduction: international courts and compliance; 2. A theory of courts and compliance in international law; 3. The empirical relevance of the theoretical model: evaluating the hypotheses in the European Union context; 4. Preliminary considerations on testing the political-sensitivity hypothesis: designing a control for the legal merits; 5. A test of the political-sensitivity hypothesis; 6. A test of the conditional-effectiveness hypothesis: the European Court of Justice and economic integration; 7. Conclusion.
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