52,99 €
inkl. MwSt.
Versandkostenfrei*
Versandfertig in über 4 Wochen
Melden Sie sich
hier
hier
für den Produktalarm an, um über die Verfügbarkeit des Produkts informiert zu werden.
- Broschiertes Buch
In this book, some of Philip Towleâ s major contributions are brought together to shed light on the Cold War and its aftermath.
Andere Kunden interessierten sich auch für
- Philip TowleIntervention and Disarmament123,99 €
- Martin MccauleyOrigins of the Cold War 1941-194934,99 €
- Max HastingsAbyss34,99 €
- Andrew FutterThe Politics of Nuclear Weapons56,99 €
- Tudor A. OneaThe Grand Strategies of Great Powers37,99 €
- Oliver StoneThe Untold History of the United States17,99 €
- David PainterThe Cold War54,99 €
-
-
-
In this book, some of Philip Towleâ s major contributions are brought together to shed light on the Cold War and its aftermath.
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Routledge Studies in Modern History
- Verlag: Taylor & Francis Ltd
- Seitenzahl: 174
- Erscheinungstermin: 29. Januar 2024
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 156mm x 234mm x 15mm
- Gewicht: 286g
- ISBN-13: 9781032046129
- ISBN-10: 1032046120
- Artikelnr.: 69792745
- Routledge Studies in Modern History
- Verlag: Taylor & Francis Ltd
- Seitenzahl: 174
- Erscheinungstermin: 29. Januar 2024
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 156mm x 234mm x 15mm
- Gewicht: 286g
- ISBN-13: 9781032046129
- ISBN-10: 1032046120
- Artikelnr.: 69792745
Philip Towle is a retired Fellow of Queens' College, Cambridge and a former Director of the Cambridge Centre of International Studies. Before Cambridge he held posts at the Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Australian National University. He is the author or editor of 14 books and 37 chapters in other publications. His books include Arms Control and East-West Relations (1982), Enforced Disarmament (1997), Democracy and Peacemaking (2000), Going to War (2009), History, Empathy and Conflict (2018).
Introduction Part 1 1. Culture and Intervention 2. Politics and Religion 3.
The Strategy of War by Proxy 4. Should the West Arm Guerrillas? 5. The
British Debate about Intervention in Yugoslavia 6. Forecasting the Outcome
of the Gulf War 7. The PGM Revolution in Weaponry Part 2 Introduction 8.
Blackett and Nuclear weapons 9. Winston Churchill and British Disarmament
Policy 10. Arms Control and declining Powers 11. The Soviet Union and the
Biological Weapons Convention 12. Autocrats and MDW 13. Forced Disarmament
Without War 14. Minimum Deterrence and Democratic Verification Conclusion
The Strategy of War by Proxy 4. Should the West Arm Guerrillas? 5. The
British Debate about Intervention in Yugoslavia 6. Forecasting the Outcome
of the Gulf War 7. The PGM Revolution in Weaponry Part 2 Introduction 8.
Blackett and Nuclear weapons 9. Winston Churchill and British Disarmament
Policy 10. Arms Control and declining Powers 11. The Soviet Union and the
Biological Weapons Convention 12. Autocrats and MDW 13. Forced Disarmament
Without War 14. Minimum Deterrence and Democratic Verification Conclusion
Introduction Part 1 1. Culture and Intervention 2. Politics and Religion 3.
The Strategy of War by Proxy 4. Should the West Arm Guerrillas? 5. The
British Debate about Intervention in Yugoslavia 6. Forecasting the Outcome
of the Gulf War 7. The PGM Revolution in Weaponry Part 2 Introduction 8.
Blackett and Nuclear weapons 9. Winston Churchill and British Disarmament
Policy 10. Arms Control and declining Powers 11. The Soviet Union and the
Biological Weapons Convention 12. Autocrats and MDW 13. Forced Disarmament
Without War 14. Minimum Deterrence and Democratic Verification Conclusion
The Strategy of War by Proxy 4. Should the West Arm Guerrillas? 5. The
British Debate about Intervention in Yugoslavia 6. Forecasting the Outcome
of the Gulf War 7. The PGM Revolution in Weaponry Part 2 Introduction 8.
Blackett and Nuclear weapons 9. Winston Churchill and British Disarmament
Policy 10. Arms Control and declining Powers 11. The Soviet Union and the
Biological Weapons Convention 12. Autocrats and MDW 13. Forced Disarmament
Without War 14. Minimum Deterrence and Democratic Verification Conclusion