Bezalel Peleg, Peter Sudhölter

Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games

• Broschiertes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games systematically studies the main solutions of cooperative games: the core, bargaining set, kernel, nucleolus, and the Shapley value of TU games, and the core, the Shapley value, and the ordinal bargaining set of NTU games. To each solution a separate chapter is devoted, in which its properties are investigated in full detail. Moreover, important variants are defined or even intensively analyzed. Separate chapters cover continuity, dynamics, and geometric properties of solutions of TU games. This study culminates in uniform and coherent axiomatizations of all the foregoing solutions (excluding the bargaining set). Except for the Shapley value such axiomatizations have not appeared in any book. Moreover, Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games contains a detailed analysis of the main results on cooperative games without side payments. Such analysis is very limited or non-existent in the existing literature on game theory.

Produktdetails

• Theory and Decision Library C: Vol.34
• Verlag: Springer, Berlin
• Seitenzahl: 400
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 233mm x 155mm x 21mm
• Gewicht: 597g
• ISBN-13: 9781402077845
• ISBN-10: 140207784X
• Artikelnr.: 22062705

Autorenporträt

Bezalel Peleg is professor emeritus of mathematics and fellow of the Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He is a fellow of the Econometric Society and the author of Game Theoretic Analysis of Voting in Committees (1984). He published articles in various journals of mathematics, economic theory, social choice and welfare, game theory, and other fields. Peter Sudhölter is associate professor at the Department of Economics of the University of Southern Denmark at Odense. His list of publications indicates his interest in game theory with some emphasis on axiomatic approaches.

Inhaltsangabe

TU Games.- Coalitional TU Games and Solutions.- The Core.- Bargaining Sets.- The Prekernel, Kernel, and Nucleolus.- The Prenucleolus.- Geometric Properties of the ?-Core, Kernel, and Prekernel.- The Shapley Value.- Continuity Properties of Solutions.- Dynamic Bargaining Procedures for the Kernel and the Bargaining Set.- NTU Games.- Cooperative Games in Strategic and Coalitional Form.- The Core of NTU Games.- The Shapley NTU Value and the Harsanyi Solution.- The Consistent Shapley Value.- On the Classical Bargaining Set and the Mas-Colell Bargaining Set for NTU Games.- Variants of the Davis-Maschler Bargaining Set for NTU Games.