This Element explains Kant's distinction between rational sympathy and natural sympathy. In rational sympathy, we freely use the imagination to step into others' first-person perspectives and associate imagined intuitional contents with the concepts others use to communicate their feelings. This prompts feelings in us that are like their feelings.
This Element explains Kant's distinction between rational sympathy and natural sympathy. In rational sympathy, we freely use the imagination to step into others' first-person perspectives and associate imagined intuitional contents with the concepts others use to communicate their feelings. This prompts feelings in us that are like their feelings.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
1. Introduction 2. The Distinction Between Rational and Natural Sympathy 3. A Debate about Translating Doctrine of Virtue §§34-5, and a Concern about Passivity 4. Sympathy and the Imagination 5. Putting Ourselves in Others' Places 6. Correctly Communicating Feeling 7. What Problem in Kant's Ethics is Solved by Rational Sympathy? 8. Responding to Exclusionists, and Distinguishing Adopting and Promoting Ends 9. How Rational Sympathy Allows Adoption of Merely Permissible Ends 10. Sages and Sympathy in Kant's Theory of Friendship 11. Friendship as an Ideal of Sharing All Our Ends and All Our Feelings 12. Four Objections to the Rationally Sympathetic Interpretation of Friendship 13. Sympathy as a Moral Incentive, and its Relationship to Respect 14. Contemporary and Historical Connections to Empathy 15. Conclusion Bibliography.
1. Introduction 2. The Distinction Between Rational and Natural Sympathy 3. A Debate about Translating Doctrine of Virtue §§34-5, and a Concern about Passivity 4. Sympathy and the Imagination 5. Putting Ourselves in Others' Places 6. Correctly Communicating Feeling 7. What Problem in Kant's Ethics is Solved by Rational Sympathy? 8. Responding to Exclusionists, and Distinguishing Adopting and Promoting Ends 9. How Rational Sympathy Allows Adoption of Merely Permissible Ends 10. Sages and Sympathy in Kant's Theory of Friendship 11. Friendship as an Ideal of Sharing All Our Ends and All Our Feelings 12. Four Objections to the Rationally Sympathetic Interpretation of Friendship 13. Sympathy as a Moral Incentive, and its Relationship to Respect 14. Contemporary and Historical Connections to Empathy 15. Conclusion Bibliography.
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