This book focuses on the Kenyan mediation of the Somali conflict and strategic intervention engagement between 2002 and 2012. It reveals that Kenya s diplomatic and stabilization efforts had their own dynamics and challenges. This is especially so with regard to the preferred policy option of exercising diplomacy that utilizes soft-power resources. This diplomacy had to contend with sensitive aspects of the process involving the complicated engagement with the Somali conflict-constituencies, and a complex mapping of various actors and interests. Contrary to the expected outcomes, interests and issues proliferated, and the original peace-making agenda was consistently slowed down and complicated. It recommends amongst other aspects that Kenya s diplomacy should adopt a strategy of co-operation with those regional regimes that it helped to establish. A case in reference is utilizing regional arms control and disarmament diplomacy. This is Kenya s intermediary co-operative role withthe Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA). The book will appeal to students, pedantic analysts and policy practitioners in the fields of international relations, diplomacy and strategic-security affairs.