Andere Kunden interessierten sich auch für
![Keynes on the Wireless]( "Keynes on the Wireless")
Keynes on the Wireless37,99 €![John Maynard Keynes]( "John Maynard Keynes")
John Maynard Keynes124,99 €![Essays in Biography]( "Essays in Biography")
Essays in Biography37,99 €![Essays in Persuasion]( "Essays in Persuasion")
Essays in Persuasion55,99 €![Capital and Interest]( "Capital and Interest")
Capital and Interest22,99 €![The State of Interpretation of Keynes]( "The State of Interpretation of Keynes")
The State of Interpretation of Keynes83,99 €![Keynes]( "Keynes")
Keynes23,99 €
Geoff Tily argues that Keynes was primarily concerned with monetary policy, not fiscal policy. Viewed as a coherent whole, Keynes's work was concerned with the appropriate technique and infrastructure for the management of money at low rates of interest. More specifically, his rejection of the gold standard led ultimately to his proposal for an international clearing union to support domestic debt-management and monetary policies aimed at cheap money. His ideas became reality. With the start of the Great Depression, governments across the world began a (short-lived) era of the deliberate management of money.
While many others have argued that 'Keynesian' economics is a misrepresentation of Keynes's theory, Tily argues that 'Keynesian' economics also permitted a gross misrepresentation of his economic policies. 'Keynesian' economics was a different theory opposed, and indeed rival, to Keynes's work. With the policy perspective restored, an alternative presentation of Keynes's economics, based on post-Keynesian economics, is permitted.
In this revised edition, Geoff Tily argues that the economics profession has distorted and betrayed Keynes's legacy. In virtually all interpretations especially that taught to students Keynes is portrayed as concerned only with government expenditure as a means to cure economic crisis. Yet Keynes's central aim was the prevention of economic crisis. His prescription to do so concerned monetary not fiscal policy.
From the moment the great depression began, Keynes began to influence greatly the monetary policy of the world. Countries, led by the UK and US, put in place capital controls and mechanisms to manage exchange rates, and changes to debt management and credit policies that permitted the orderly management of money at low long-term and short-term interest rates on what should have been a permanent basis. The Bretton Woods negotiations went some way to re-enforce and formalise these policies, but did not go far enough.
The current crisis is rooted in the dismantling of the remnants of the Bretton Woods architecture and the liberalisation of finance that began even before 1970. Tily argues that we should not be surprised that the neglect of Keynes's policies is leading to a crisis of similar magnitude to the depression that motivated the development and implementation of those policies in the first place. It is to the same policies that we must turn, as the crisis becomes a reality.
This book argues that Keynes was primarily concerned with monetary policy not fiscal policy, and that the loss of these conclusions is of grave consequence
While many others have argued that 'Keynesian' economics is a misrepresentation of Keynes's theory, Tily argues that 'Keynesian' economics also permitted a gross misrepresentation of his economic policies. 'Keynesian' economics was a different theory opposed, and indeed rival, to Keynes's work. With the policy perspective restored, an alternative presentation of Keynes's economics, based on post-Keynesian economics, is permitted.
In this revised edition, Geoff Tily argues that the economics profession has distorted and betrayed Keynes's legacy. In virtually all interpretations especially that taught to students Keynes is portrayed as concerned only with government expenditure as a means to cure economic crisis. Yet Keynes's central aim was the prevention of economic crisis. His prescription to do so concerned monetary not fiscal policy.
From the moment the great depression began, Keynes began to influence greatly the monetary policy of the world. Countries, led by the UK and US, put in place capital controls and mechanisms to manage exchange rates, and changes to debt management and credit policies that permitted the orderly management of money at low long-term and short-term interest rates on what should have been a permanent basis. The Bretton Woods negotiations went some way to re-enforce and formalise these policies, but did not go far enough.
The current crisis is rooted in the dismantling of the remnants of the Bretton Woods architecture and the liberalisation of finance that began even before 1970. Tily argues that we should not be surprised that the neglect of Keynes's policies is leading to a crisis of similar magnitude to the depression that motivated the development and implementation of those policies in the first place. It is to the same policies that we must turn, as the crisis becomes a reality.
This book argues that Keynes was primarily concerned with monetary policy not fiscal policy, and that the loss of these conclusions is of grave consequence
' such an important book not merely another book on the history of Keynes's monetary thought. It provides compelling evidence of where 'Keynesians' of all shades have gone wrong and simultaneously provides them with the ammunition to generalize what passes for modern monetary theory and macroeconomics. It enables macroeconomists to put Keynes back into Keynesian economics.' - Colin Rogers, University of Adelaide, Australia
'This is an extraordinary book and a major and significant contribution to Post-Keyensian literature.' - Jan Toporowski, School of African and Oriental Studies, University of London, UK
'Above all, this book is a good read, which may achieve that rare combination of a high level of scholarship with relevance to the policy advisor.' - Mark Hayes, University of Cambridge, UK
What's all the fuss about then? Well, unlike most books on economics, this one is beautifully written, with only the simplest few equations, no acronyms or abstruse jargon in sight, and not too long. In three parts History, Theory, and Macroeconomics after Keynes Tily explains carefully and clearly what Keynes was concerned about and actually wrote; how that was used and abused by his contemporaries for their own academic purposes; and what are the implications of his persuasive arguments for the contemporary policy debate. . Tily argues in his new preface, at first surprisingly but ultimately convincingly, that it follows that Keynes's own view would have been that the problems of the last decade have been caused by so much credit advanced not at interest rates that were too low, but rather too high and that the multitude of derivatives (CDO² and so on) were then spawned in a doomed attempt to lower the effective cost of the debt burden assumed. It is a work of inspiring scholarship that will surely make a great present for someone interested in both economics and the history of the mid-twentieth century who would like to understand more about whom to support in the current vigorous policy debates: Krugman or Rogoff? Wolf or Osborne? And just what Keynes himself would have thought about what they have to say, . Do buy! - Diana Hunter, Financial World
'This is an extraordinary book and a major and significant contribution to Post-Keyensian literature.' - Jan Toporowski, School of African and Oriental Studies, University of London, UK
'Above all, this book is a good read, which may achieve that rare combination of a high level of scholarship with relevance to the policy advisor.' - Mark Hayes, University of Cambridge, UK
What's all the fuss about then? Well, unlike most books on economics, this one is beautifully written, with only the simplest few equations, no acronyms or abstruse jargon in sight, and not too long. In three parts History, Theory, and Macroeconomics after Keynes Tily explains carefully and clearly what Keynes was concerned about and actually wrote; how that was used and abused by his contemporaries for their own academic purposes; and what are the implications of his persuasive arguments for the contemporary policy debate. . Tily argues in his new preface, at first surprisingly but ultimately convincingly, that it follows that Keynes's own view would have been that the problems of the last decade have been caused by so much credit advanced not at interest rates that were too low, but rather too high and that the multitude of derivatives (CDO² and so on) were then spawned in a doomed attempt to lower the effective cost of the debt burden assumed. It is a work of inspiring scholarship that will surely make a great present for someone interested in both economics and the history of the mid-twentieth century who would like to understand more about whom to support in the current vigorous policy debates: Krugman or Rogoff? Wolf or Osborne? And just what Keynes himself would have thought about what they have to say, . Do buy! - Diana Hunter, Financial World