Dramatic as the corporate takeovers of recent years have been, it is far from clear what underlying forces are at work, and what their long-term consequences will be. This book represents one of the first sustained efforts to examine the complex issues surrounding the corporate takeover. Based on papers presented at a symposium sponsored by Columbia Law School's Center for Law and Economic Studies, it airs new theories and offers vital insights into events that have become central to American corporate culture.
Dramatic as the corporate takeovers of recent years have been, it is far from clear what underlying forces are at work, and what their long-term consequences will be. This book represents one of the first sustained efforts to examine the complex issues surrounding the corporate takeover. Based on papers presented at a symposium sponsored by Columbia Law School's Center for Law and Economic Studies, it airs new theories and offers vital insights into events that have become central to American corporate culture.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
* Contributors * Sponsors * Introduction * 1: Hostile Takeovers and Junk Bond Financing: A Panel Discussion * CAPITAL MARKETS, EFFICIENCY, AND CORPORATE CONTROL * 2: Martin Shubik: Corporate Control, Efficient Markets, and the Public Good * 3: Robert J. Shiller: Fashions, Fads, and Bubbles in Financial Markets * 4: Franklin R. Edwards: Comment * 5: Michael A. Salinger: Comment * MANAGERIAL BEHAVIOR AND TAKEOVERS * 6: John C. Coffee, Jr.: Shareholders Versus Managers: the Strain in the Corporate Web * 7: Malcolm S. Salter and Wolf A. Weinhold: Corporate Takeovers: Financial Boom or Organizational Bust? * 8: Victor Brudney: Comment * 9: Melvin A. Eisenberg: Comment: Golden Parachutes and Managers--A Risk-Neutral Perspective * 10: Oliver E. Williamson: Comment: Shareholders and Managers--A Risk-Neutral Perspective * EVIDENCE ON THE GAINS FROM MERGERS AND TAKEOVERS * 11: Ellen B. Magenheim and Dennis C. Mueller: Are Acquiring-Firm Shareholders Better Off after an Acquisition? * 12: David J. Ravenscraft and F. M. Scherer: Mergers and Managerial Performance * 13: Edward S. Herman and Louis Lowenstein: The Efficiency Effects of Hostile Takeovers * 14: Richard Roll: Empirical Evidence on Takeover Activity and Shareholder Wealth * 15: Michael Bradley and Gregg A. Jarrell: Comment * 16: Warren A. Law: Comment * 17: Discussion * MERGERS AND TAKEOVERS: TAXES, CAPITAL STRUCTURE, AND THE INCENTIVES OF MANAGERS * 18: Ronald J. Gilson, Myron S. Scholes, and Mark A. Wolfson: Taxation and the Dynamics of Corporate Control: The Uncertain Case for Tax-Motivated Acquisitions * 19: Alan J. Auerbach and David Reishus: Taxes and the Merger Decision * 20: Michael C. Jensen: The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and Evidence * 21: Richard S. Ruback: Comment * 22: John L. Vogelstein: Comment * 23: Elliott J. Weiss: Comment * 24: Martin D. Ginsburg: Comment * LEGAL RULES, TAKEOVER STRATEGIES, AND DEFENSIVE TACTICS * 25: Lucian Arye Bebchuk: The Pressure to Tender: An Analysis and a Proposed Remedy * 26: Deborah A. DeMott: Comparative Dimensions of Takeover Regulation * 27: Peter Frazer: The Regulation of Takeovers in Great Britain * 28: Douglas H. Ginsburg: Comment * 29: Marshall L. Small: Comment * 30: Stanley Sporkin: Comment * ONE SHARE, ONE VOTE * 31: Joel Seligman: Stock Exchange Rules Affecting Takeovers and Control Transactions * 32: Daniel R. Fischel: Organized Exchanges and the Regulation of Dual Class Common Stock * 33: Robert H. Mundheim: Comment * 34: A. A. Sommer, Jr.: Comment * Index
* Contributors * Sponsors * Introduction * 1: Hostile Takeovers and Junk Bond Financing: A Panel Discussion * CAPITAL MARKETS, EFFICIENCY, AND CORPORATE CONTROL * 2: Martin Shubik: Corporate Control, Efficient Markets, and the Public Good * 3: Robert J. Shiller: Fashions, Fads, and Bubbles in Financial Markets * 4: Franklin R. Edwards: Comment * 5: Michael A. Salinger: Comment * MANAGERIAL BEHAVIOR AND TAKEOVERS * 6: John C. Coffee, Jr.: Shareholders Versus Managers: the Strain in the Corporate Web * 7: Malcolm S. Salter and Wolf A. Weinhold: Corporate Takeovers: Financial Boom or Organizational Bust? * 8: Victor Brudney: Comment * 9: Melvin A. Eisenberg: Comment: Golden Parachutes and Managers--A Risk-Neutral Perspective * 10: Oliver E. Williamson: Comment: Shareholders and Managers--A Risk-Neutral Perspective * EVIDENCE ON THE GAINS FROM MERGERS AND TAKEOVERS * 11: Ellen B. Magenheim and Dennis C. Mueller: Are Acquiring-Firm Shareholders Better Off after an Acquisition? * 12: David J. Ravenscraft and F. M. Scherer: Mergers and Managerial Performance * 13: Edward S. Herman and Louis Lowenstein: The Efficiency Effects of Hostile Takeovers * 14: Richard Roll: Empirical Evidence on Takeover Activity and Shareholder Wealth * 15: Michael Bradley and Gregg A. Jarrell: Comment * 16: Warren A. Law: Comment * 17: Discussion * MERGERS AND TAKEOVERS: TAXES, CAPITAL STRUCTURE, AND THE INCENTIVES OF MANAGERS * 18: Ronald J. Gilson, Myron S. Scholes, and Mark A. Wolfson: Taxation and the Dynamics of Corporate Control: The Uncertain Case for Tax-Motivated Acquisitions * 19: Alan J. Auerbach and David Reishus: Taxes and the Merger Decision * 20: Michael C. Jensen: The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and Evidence * 21: Richard S. Ruback: Comment * 22: John L. Vogelstein: Comment * 23: Elliott J. Weiss: Comment * 24: Martin D. Ginsburg: Comment * LEGAL RULES, TAKEOVER STRATEGIES, AND DEFENSIVE TACTICS * 25: Lucian Arye Bebchuk: The Pressure to Tender: An Analysis and a Proposed Remedy * 26: Deborah A. DeMott: Comparative Dimensions of Takeover Regulation * 27: Peter Frazer: The Regulation of Takeovers in Great Britain * 28: Douglas H. Ginsburg: Comment * 29: Marshall L. Small: Comment * 30: Stanley Sporkin: Comment * ONE SHARE, ONE VOTE * 31: Joel Seligman: Stock Exchange Rules Affecting Takeovers and Control Transactions * 32: Daniel R. Fischel: Organized Exchanges and the Regulation of Dual Class Common Stock * 33: Robert H. Mundheim: Comment * 34: A. A. Sommer, Jr.: Comment * Index
Es gelten unsere Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen: www.buecher.de/agb
Impressum
www.buecher.de ist ein Internetauftritt der buecher.de internetstores GmbH
Geschäftsführung: Monica Sawhney | Roland Kölbl | Günter Hilger
Sitz der Gesellschaft: Batheyer Straße 115 - 117, 58099 Hagen
Postanschrift: Bürgermeister-Wegele-Str. 12, 86167 Augsburg
Amtsgericht Hagen HRB 13257
Steuernummer: 321/5800/1497
USt-IdNr: DE450055826
