This is the first book to develop a comprehensive epistemic theory of checking. The author argues that sensitivity is necessary for checking but not for knowing, thereby finding a new home for the much discussed modal sensitivity principle. He then uses the distinction between checking and knowing to explain central puzzles about knowledge.
This is the first book to develop a comprehensive epistemic theory of checking. The author argues that sensitivity is necessary for checking but not for knowing, thereby finding a new home for the much discussed modal sensitivity principle. He then uses the distinction between checking and knowing to explain central puzzles about knowledge.
Part I: Checking Chapter 1: Introduction: The Methodological Approach Chapter 2: Modal Knowledge Accounts Chapter 3: SAC: A Sensitivity Account of Checking Chapter 4: Checking, Alternatives, and Discrimination Chapter 5: Checking, Inferences, and Necessities Part II: Checking and Knowledge Puzzles Chapter 6: SAC and Knowledge Puzzles Chapter 7: Checking and Bootstrapping Chapter 8: SAC and the Skeptical Puzzle
Part I: Checking Chapter 1: Introduction: The Methodological Approach Chapter 2: Modal Knowledge Accounts Chapter 3: SAC: A Sensitivity Account of Checking Chapter 4: Checking, Alternatives, and Discrimination Chapter 5: Checking, Inferences, and Necessities Part II: Checking and Knowledge Puzzles Chapter 6: SAC and Knowledge Puzzles Chapter 7: Checking and Bootstrapping Chapter 8: SAC and the Skeptical Puzzle
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